Emmendingeni lahing, 19. oktoober 1796

Emmendingeni lahing, 19. oktoober 1796


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Emmendingeni lahing, 19. oktoober 1796

Tagasi Reini äärde
Maastik
Austria seisukohad ja plaanid
Prantsuse plaan
Lahing
20. oktoober

Emmendingeni lahing (19. oktoober 1796) oli Austria võit, mis kõrvaldas igasuguse võimaluse, et kindral Moreau Reini-Moseli armee oleks võinud oma taganemise lõpus säilitada oma koha Reini idakaldal. Lõuna -Saksamaal.

1796. aasta suvel olid prantslased alustanud kaheosalist sissetungi Saksamaale. Moreau jõudis Müncheni äärelinna, enne kui avastas, et Jourdan on Ambergis ja Würzburgis lüüa saanud ning taandub tagasi Reini jõele. Moreau alustas aeglast taganemist tagasi läände, Austria armee kindral Latouri juhtimisel järgnes talle tihedalt. Moreau ei olnud veel valmis oma kampaaniast täielikult loobuma ja pöördus 2. oktoobril tagasi ning põhjustas Latourile Biberachis kuluka kaotuse, kuid ertshertsog Charles hakkas nüüd oma tagala ähvardama ja Moreau oli sunnitud taandumist jätkama.

Tagasi Reini äärde

Päev pärast võitu Biberachis oli Moreau endiselt potentsiaalselt ohtlikus seisus. Reini-Moseli armee asus Doonau lõunakaldal Reini oru suhtelisest ohutusest kaheksakümmend miili ida pool. Reinini jõudmiseks peaksid nad ületama kaks mäeahelikku - Alb ja Schwarzwald. Latouri armee oli Biberachis pekstud, kuid mitte hävitatud ja jälgis endiselt nende taandumist. Kindralid Nauendorf ja Petrasch olid ühinenud Hechingenis, Albi põhjapoolsetel nõlvadel. Ka austerlastel oli vägesid Strasbourgist põhja pool Reini idakaldal ja Jourdani armee lõplik lüüasaamine Altenkirchenis (19. september) oli vabastanud ertshertsog Charles'i koos täiendustega lõunasse liikuma.

Moreau lootis ületada Musta metsa Kinzigi oru abil, mis oleks viinud ta Strasbourgi lähedal asuvasse Reini orgu, kuid see tee oli nüüd suletud. Selle asemel otsustas ta kasutada Höllentali. See org läbib Šveitsi metsa ühte kõrgemat lõiku, kakskümmend miili Šveitsi piirist põhja pool, kulgedes Hinterzartenist idas Kirchzarteni ja Buchenbachiga mägede keskel. Laiem org kulgeb seejärel läände Freiburg im Breisgau, Reini tasandiku serval.

See marsruut jättis sõjaväe peagi üsna venitatuks. Kui suurem osa armeest kolis Riedlingeni, mis asub Doonau ääres Biberachist kümme miili lääne pool, ületas eelvalvur Alb ja vallutas Villengeni ja Rothweiti, lõhe lõuna poole, Albi ja Schwarzwaldi vahel. Sõjaväe vasak tiib järgnes neile ja asus Rothweiti positsioonile, näoga põhja poole, et kaitsta Nauendorfi mis tahes liikumise eest. Armee parem tiib kolis Tuttlingeni, Albi lõunapoolsesse otsa, ja pöördus ida poole, et Latourile vastu astuda.

Armee keskus Saint-Cyr'i juhtimisel sundis Höllentali läbima. Kaks passi valvanud Austria pataljoni kolonel Aspresi juhtimisel olid sunnitud taanduma orust välja ja Emmendingeni, kuus miili Freiburg im Breisgaust põhja pool. Püha Cyr sisenes Freiburgi 12. oktoobril ja ülejäänud armee järgnes paaril päeval üle selle. Raskemad seadmed läksid lõunapoolsemat teed pidi ja sõitsid Huningue'i, peaaegu Šveitsi piirile, mida kaitsesid Tharreau ja Paillardi brigaadid, kes pidasid kindral Froelichi kergejõudude vastu mitmeid väiksemaid tagantjärele.

Moreau järgmine eesmärk oli avada side Strasbourgi vastas asuva Kehli kindlustatud laagriga, kus ta juunis esmakordselt Reini ületas. Selle asemel, et uuesti Reini ületada ja Prantsusmaa läänerannikult Strasbourgi edasi liikuda, otsustas ta võidelda idakaldalt üles.

Maastik

Emmendingeni lahing toimus Elzi orus. See org siksakib läbi Schwarzwaldi, enne kui kerkib Breisgaus Freiburgist põhja pool asuvasse Reini tasandikku. Lahingus osalenud oru lõik kulgeb edelas läbi mägede Elzachist läbi Bleibachi ja Waldkirchi. Vahetult Waldkirchist edelas tuleb jõgi mägedest välja ja pöörab paremale, suubudes loodesse Reini poole, paremal pool Schwarzwaldi. See jõelõik läbib Emmendingeni ja jõuab Riegelini. Aastal 1796 pöördus jõgi Riegeli juures põhja poole ja kulges paralleelselt Schwarzwaldiga, kuni jõudis Reini jõe äärde põhja poole. Riegel istub kitsas lõhes Schwarzwaldi ja Kaiserstuhli nime all tuntud vulkaaniliste küngaste vahel.

Austria seisukohad ja plaanid

Moreau eduvõimalused selles ettevõtmises läksid iga päevaga aina hullemaks. 15. oktoobril jõudis ertshertsog Charles Offenburgi, viisteist miili Kehlist kagusse, kus ta ühines Petraschi ja Nauenbourgi vasaku tiivaga. Latour tõusis Kinzigi orust välja 17. oktoobril ja jõudis 18. oktoobril viieteistkümne miili lõuna poole jäävasse Mahlbergi laagrisse. Condé ja Froelich olid Neustadtis, Höllentali idaotsas, ja kindral Wolf oli veidi lõuna pool, Waldshutis. Ertshertsog tahtis algselt 18. oktoobril prantslaste vastu rünnakut alustada, kuid Latour’i mehed vajasid oma marsist taastumiseks päeva ja nii lükati rünnak järgmisele päevale.

Ertshertsog jagas oma armee neljaks kolonniks. Kindral Nauendorff oli Elzi ülemises orus koos 6000 mehega (8 pataljoni ja 14 eskadrilli). Ta pidi edasi liikuma edelasse Waldkirchi poole.

Feldzeugmeister Wilhelm Graf Wartensleben koos 8500 mehega (12 pataljoni ja 23 eskadrilli) pidi edasi liikuma lõunasse üle Schwarzwaldi jalamile ja vallutama Elmi silla Emmendingenis.

Kindral Latour koos 6000 mehega (8 pataljoni ja 15 eskadrilli) pidi samuti Heimbachi ja Malterdingeni kaudu (Riegelist ida pool) ületama Schwarzwaldi jalamil ja vallutama Köndringeni silla, poolel teel Riegeli ja Emmendingeni vahel.

Fürstenbergi vürst kindral Karl Alois pidas Kenzingeni 2-3 miili kaugusel Riegelist põhja pool Elzi algsel kursil. Talle anti käsk korraldada meeleavaldusi Riegeli vastu ning kaitsta Austria põhipositsioonist põhja pool asuvat Rustit, Kappeli ja Grafenhauseni.

Kaugemale lõuna poole pidid kindral Froelich ja Condé prints kindrali Ferino ja prantslased Stiegi orus maha lööma.

Prantsuse plaan

Moreau rünnakuplaan oli peaaegu täpne peegelpilt Austria plaanist. Kindral Delmas pidi ründama Riegeli, kus ta põrkas kokku Fürstenbergi printsiga.

Kindral Beauput pidi hõivama Malterdingeni (3 miili Emmendingenist loodes) ja Kondringeni kõrgused. Ta seisaks silmitsi Latouri veeruga.

Keskuse esimene jaotus pidi hoidma Emmendingeni, kus seda ründaks Wartensleben.

Keskuse teise divisjoniga Saint-Cyr pidi ründama kirde suunas üles Elzi orgu Bleibachi suunas, kus ta jooksis pea ees Nauendorffi.

Rünnak hõlmaks ainult tema armee keskust, sest kindral Desaix oli vasakpoolse tiivaga lõunas, samal ajal kui kindral Ferino paremal pool valvas üle Schwarzwaldi. Selle tulemusel ületas Moreau ertshertsog, kuigi rünnakus osales vaid umbes 20 000 austerlast.

Lahing

Võitlused mägedes läksid austerlaste teed. Koidikul hakkas Saint-Cyr Elzi orust ülespoole liikuma, samal ajal kui Nauendorf valmistus orust allapoole liikuma. Saint-Cyr otsustas saata teise väikese kolonni üle mägede orust ida poole, sihiks külgorus asuv Simonswaldi küla. Ta lootis, et see jõud tabab Nauendorfi vasakpoolset ja sunnib teda Bleibachist taanduma. Prantslaste õnnetuseks oli Nauendorf Elzi oru kõrval kõrgustesse postitanud küljed ja Saint-Cyr'i mehed olid Austria laskurite varitsuses. Teisel pool Elzi orgu saavutasid rohkem Austria laskurid valitseva positsiooni Kolnaus, mis jättis Waldkirchi vaatevälja. Saint-Cyr oli sunnitud tühistama Bleibachi edasipääsu ja taandus Waldkirchi. Nauendorf jätkas tema surumist ja Saint-Cyr oli sunnitud taanduma veel kaks miili Denzlingeni.

Umbes keskpäeval ründas Latour kaks kolonni Beaupuyt Matterdingenis. Beaupuy tapeti lahingu alguses ja segaduses põhjustas see, et tema diviis ei saanud käsku taanduda mööda Elzi Wasserisse, Emmendingenist lõuna pool.

Wartensleben, kesklinnas Austria, võttis kogu päeva, et võidelda Emmendingeni. Kahte tema veergu pidasid prantsuse laskurid püsti Landecki metsas, kaks miili Emmendingenist põhja pool, ja ta ise sai raskelt haavata. Lõpuks olid prantslased sunnitud hilisõhtul taanduma, kui Wartenslebeni kolmas kolonn ähvardas nende õigustest üle sõita. Seejärel taandusid prantslased üle jõe, hävitades nende taga olevad sillad.

Päeva lõpuks oli Moreau väga kehvas seisus. Delmas oli Riegelis ja Endingenis, Kaiserstuhli kirdenurgas. Saint-Cyr parempoolne oli Denzlingeni taga ja vasak Unterreutes. Prantsuse keskus oli Nimburgis, poolel teel Riegeli ja Unterreute vahel. Prantsuse joon oli suunatud kirde poole austerlaste poole. 19. ja 20. oktoobri öösel parandasid austerlased Emmendingeni silda ja 20. oktoobri hommikuks oli ertshertsog Denzlingeni lähedal laagris.

20. oktoober

20. oktoobril loobus Moreau lõpuks kõigist plaanidest Reini idakaldal üles liikumiseks. Desaixil anti käsk ületada Reis Brisachis (Kaiserstuhli lõunapoolses otsas ja kümme miili Freiburgist läänes) ning liikuda põhja poole Strasbourgi ja Kehli suunas.

Prantsuse keskus tõmbus oma kõige arenenumatelt positsioonidelt tagasi ja asus uuele positsioonile Dresiami (oja, mis kulgeb Freiburgist põhja poole Riegeli) taha. Armee parema tiivaga Ferino oli endiselt Saint-Pierre'i orus ja kui prantslased Freiburgi kaotaksid, jääks ta orus Condé ja Froelichi ning tasandikul asuva ertshertsogi vahele.

Prantslased pidasid Dresiami ääres piisavalt kaua vastu, et Ferino saaks turvaliselt jõuda. Condé ja Froelich olid tihedalt taga ning kui nad avasid tule Freiburgis prantslaste pihta, oli Saint-Cyr lõpuks sunnitud taanduma. Edasi loode poole võitles Latour neljandal katsel üle Dresiami ja Fürstenburgi prints vallutas Riegeli.

Prantslased taandusid Pfaffenweileri kõrguste ümber ja tõmbusid seejärel tagasi Baseli lähedal asuva Huningue silla poole. 22. oktoobril jõudis Moreau Schliengeni, mis asub kümme miili Huningue'st põhja pool, ja otsustas teha stendi, et katta oma taganemine üle jõe.

Napoleoni koduleht | Raamatud Napoleoni sõdadest | Teemaindeks: Napoleoni sõjad


Emmendingeni lahing, 19. oktoober 1796 - ajalugu

19. oktoobril 1796 Emmendingeni lahingus võitles Prantsuse Rhin-et-Moselle'i armee Jean Victor Marie Moreau juhtimisel esimese Ülem-Reini koalitsiooniarmeega, mida juhtis Tescheni hertsog Ertshertsog Charles. Emmendingen asub Saksamaal Badeni-Württembergi linnas Elzi jõe ääres Freiburg im Breisgaust põhja pool. Tegevus toimus esimese koalitsiooni sõja ajal, mis oli suuremate Prantsuse revolutsioonisõdade esimene etapp. Pärast suvist kahe poole vahel paaritumist tõmbusid prantslased juba läbi Schwarzwaldi Reini. Läheduses jälitades sundisid austerlased prantsuse komandöri oma väed jagama, et ta saaks kolme punktiga Reini ületada Kehli, Breisachi ja Hüningeni sildade kaudu. Septembri keskpaigaks kontrollisid austerlased aga Breisachi ja Kehli ülesõitude lähenemist. Moreau soovis ikkagi, et pool oma sõjaväest läheneks austraallastele Kehli juures. Emmendingeni karm maastik raskendas lahinguid, võimaldades Habsburgi vägedel prantsuse vägede pihta hakata ning tõkestada igasuguse läbipääsu Kehli vihmase ja külma ilmaga, mis takistas veelgi mõlema poole jõupingutusi, muutes ojad ja kõrkjad kiireks veevooluks ja muutes sõiduteed libedaks. Võitlus oli äge, lahingus hukkus kaks kindralit, üks mõlemalt poolt. Habsburgide edu Emmendingenis sundis prantslasi loobuma oma plaanidest kolme- või isegi kaheosalise väljaastumise kohta. Prantslased jätkasid taganemist läbi Schwarzwaldi mägilinnade lõunasse, kus armeed pidasid viis päeva hiljem Schliengeni lahingu.

Esialgu nägid Euroopa valitsejad Prantsuse revolutsiooni kui vaidlust Prantsuse kuninga ja tema alamate vahel, mitte midagi, millesse nad peaksid sekkuma. Kui revolutsiooniline retoorika muutus üha teravamaks, kuulutasid nad Euroopa monarhide huvi Louis XVI ja tema perekonna huvidega ühte, see Pillnitzi deklaratsioon (27. august 1791) ähvardas mitmetähenduslikke, kuid üsna tõsiseid tagajärgi, kui midagi juhtuma peaks. kuninglik perekond. Revolutsionääride positsioon muutus üha raskemaks. Ühendades oma probleeme rahvusvahelistes suhetes, jätkasid Prantsuse emigrandid jätkuvalt agressiooni, et toetada vasturevolutsiooni. Lõpuks kuulutas 20. aprillil 1792 Prantsuse rahvuskonvent Austriale sõja. Esimese koalitsiooni sõjas (1792–1798) astus Prantsusmaa vastu enamikule Euroopa riikidest, kes jagasid temaga maismaa- või veepiiri, lisaks Portugalile ja Ottomani impeeriumile. Timothy Blanning. '' Prantsuse revolutsioonisõjad '', New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, lk 41–59. Hoolimata mõningatest võitudest 1792. aastal oli Prantsusmaa 1793. aasta alguseks kriisis: Prantsuse väed olid Belgiast välja tõrjutud, Prantsuse kuningas äsja hukati ja Vendées oli mäss ajateenistuse ja laialdase pahameele pärast tsiviilseaduse järgi. vaimulikest. Prantsuse Vabariigi armeed olid segaduses ja probleemid muutusid veelgi teravamaks pärast massilise ajateenistuse „levée en masse” kasutuselevõttu, mis küllastas niigi hätta sattunud armee tuhandete kirjaoskamatute ja väljaõppeta meestega. Prantslaste jaoks osutus 1795. aasta Reini kampaania eriti hukatuslikuks, kuigi nad olid saavutanud teatavat edu ka teistes sõjateatrites, sealhulgas Püreneede sõjas (1793–1795). Esimese koalitsiooni armeed hõlmasid keiserlikke kontingente ning erinevate osariikide jalaväge ja ratsaväge, kokku umbes 125 000 (sealhulgas kolm autonoomset korpust), mis oli XVIII sajandi standardite järgi suur jõud, kuid revolutsioonilise ja Napoleoni standardite järgi mõõdukas jõud. sõjad. Kokku ulatusid ülemjuhataja ertshertsogi Charlesi väed Šveitsist Põhjamereni ja Dagobert Sigmund von Wurmser Šveitsi-Itaalia piirilt Aadria mereni. Habsburgide väed moodustasid suurema osa armeest, kuid "õhuke valge joon" Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Habsburgide armee Napoleoni sõdades (1792–1815)". „Sõjaasjad”, 37: 1 (veebruar 1973), lk 1 ja ndash5, lk. 2 tsiteeritud. koalitsioonijalaväelased ei suutnud Baseli ja Frankfurdi vahelist territooriumi piisavalt sügavalt katta, et oma vastaste survele vastu seista. Võrreldes Prantsusmaa levialaga oli Charlesil Baseli lähedal Renchenist kuni Bingenini ulatuva rinde katmiseks poole vähem sõdureid. Lisaks oli ta koondanud suurema osa oma vägedest krahv Baillet Latouri juhtimisel Karlsruhe ja Darmstadti vahele, kus Reini ja Maini liitumiskoht ründas suure tõenäosusega jõgesid väravaga Ida -Saksamaa osariikidesse ja lõpuks Viini, heade sildadega, mis ületavad suhteliselt täpselt määratletud jõekallast. Temast põhja pool kattis Wilhelm von Wartenslebeni autonoomne korpus Mainzi ja Giesseni vahelise joone. Austria armee koosnes professionaalidest, paljud toodi Balkani piirialadelt ja ajateenijad keiserlikest ringkondadest.

Võitluse jätkamine: 1796

Jaanuaris 1796 sõlmisid prantslased ja esimese koalitsiooni liikmed vaherahu, lõpetades 1795. aasta Reini kampaania, mõistes, et see oli ajutine. Theodore Ayrault Dodge, „Sõda Napoleoni ajastul: revolutsioonilised sõjad esimese koalitsiooni vastu Põhja -Euroopas ja Itaalia kampaania, 1789–1797.” Leonaur, 2011. Lk 286–287 Blanning, lk 41–59 . See leping kestis kuni 20. maini 1796, mil austerlased teatasid, et see lõpeb 31. mail. Koalitsiooni Alam -Reini armeesse kuulus 90 000 sõjaväelast, peamiselt Habsburgide ja '' Reichsarmee '' (keiserlikud) väed, mis olid koondatud Püha Rooma impeeriumi osariikidest. Württembergi hertsogi Ferdinand Frederick Augusti juhitud 20 000-meheline parem tiib seisis Reini idakaldal Sieg-jõe taga, jälgides Prantsuse sillapead Düsseldorfis. Mainzi kindluse ja Ehrenbreitsteini kindluse garnisonid loendasid veel 10 000. Charles paigutas ülejäänud Habsburgide ja koalitsioonivägede läänekaldale Nahe taha. Dagobert Sigmund von Wurmser juhtis 80 000-pealist Ülem-Reini armeed. Selle parem tiib okupeeris Kaiserslauterni läänekaldal ja vasak tiib Anton Sztáray, Michael von Fröhlichi ja Condé prints Louis Josephi all valvas Reini Mannheimist Šveitsi. Algne koalitsioonistrateegia oli Trieri vallutamine ja läänekaldal asuva positsiooni kasutamine löömiseks kordamööda igale Prantsuse armeele. Viini saabusid aga uudised Bonaparte'i õnnestumistest. Olukorra ümbermõtestamisel andis Auli Nõukogu ertshertsog Charlesile käsu mõlema Austria armee üle ja käskis tal oma positsiooni hoida ning saatis Wurmseri Itaaliasse koos 25 000 abiväega. Wurmseri ja tema vägede kaotus nõrgendas koalitsioonivägesid oluliselt. Prantsuse poolel hoidis 80 000-meheline Sambre-et-Meuse armee Reini läänekallast alla Nahe ja seejärel edelasse Sankt Wendeli. Armee vasakul küljel oli Jean-Baptiste Kléber Düsseldorfi kinnistunud laagris 22 000 sõdurit. Rhin-et-Moselle'i armee parem tiib asus Reini taga Hüningenist põhja poole, selle keskus asus piki Queichi jõge Landau lähedal ja vasak tiib ulatus läände Saarbrückeni suunas. Pierre Marie Barthélemy Ferino juhtis Moreau paremat tiiba, Louis Desaix juhtis tsentrit ja Laurent Gouvion Saint-Cyr suunas vasakut tiiba. Ferino tiib koosnes kolmest jalaväe- ja ratsaväediviisist François Antoine Louis Bourcieri ja Henri François Delaborde juhtimisel. Desaixi käsk luges kolm diviisi, mida juhtisid Michel de Beaupuy, Antoine Guillaume Delmas ja Charles Antoine Xaintrailles. Saint-Cyr'i tiivas oli kaks diviisi, mida juhtisid Guillaume Philibert Duhesme ja Taponier. Prantsuse suurplaan nõudis, et kaks Prantsuse armeed suruksid Saksamaa osariikide põhjaarmeede külgedele, samal ajal lähenes kolmas armee Itaalia kaudu Viini. Jourdani armee tõrjuks Düsseldorfist kagusse, kavatsedes vägesid ja tähelepanu enda poole tõmmata, mis võimaldaks Moreau armeel kergemini Reini ületada Kehli ja Hüningeni vahel. Plaani kohaselt valetas Jourdani armee Mannheimi poole ja Charles jagas oma väed kiiresti ümber. Moreau armee ründas Kehli sillapead, mida valvas 7000 keiserlikku sõdurit - sel kevadel kogenematu ja väljaõppeta vägesid värvati Švaabimaa ringkondadest -, mis hoidsid hämmastavalt sillapead mitu tundi, kuid taandusid seejärel Rastatti poole. 23. – 24. Juunil tugevdas Moreau sillapead oma ettevalvuriga. Pärast seda, kui ta oli keiserliku miilitsa sillapealt oma positsioonilt lükanud, voolasid tema väed takistamatult Badeni. Sarnaselt liikus lõuna pool Baseli ääres Ferino kolonn kiiresti üle jõe ja tõusis mööda Reini jõge mööda Šveitsi ja Saksamaa rannajoont Bodeni järve suunas ning Schwarzwaldi lõunaossa. Muretsedes, et tema varustusliinid on liiga pikad, alustas Charles taandumist ida poole. Siinkohal tulid mängu loomupärased armukadedused ja kindralite vaheline konkurents. Moreau oleks võinud liituda Jourdani armeega põhjas, kuid ta ei jätkanud ida poole, surudes Charles Baieri. Jourdan liikus ka ida poole, lükates Wartenslebeni autonoomse korpuse Ernestine'i hertsogkondadesse, ja kumbki kindral ei paistnud olevat valmis oma tiiba kaasmaalasega ühendama. Dodge, lk 292–293. Järgnes suvi strateegilisi taganemisi, flanke ja ümberpaigutamismanöövreid. Mõlemal poolel oleks võinud opositsiooni purustada kahe armee - Wartenslebeni ja Charles'i või Jourdani - Moreau omaga. Dodge, lk 297. Wartensleben ja Charles ühinesid esimesena ning tõusulaine pöördus prantslaste vastu. 25 000 oma parima sõduriga ületas ertshertsog Regensburgis Doonau põhjakalda ja liikus põhja poole, et liituda oma kolleegi Wartenslebeniga. Jourdani armee lüüasaamine Ambergi, Würzburgi ja Altenkircheni lahingutes võimaldas Charlesil viia rohkem vägesid lõunasse. Järgmine kontakt toimus 19. oktoobril Emmendingenis. J. Rickard
'' Emmendingeni lahing ''
Sõja ajalugu
17. veebruar 2009. Kasutatud 18. novembril 2014.

Emmendingen asub Elzi orus, mis lookleb läbi Schwarzwaldi. Elz loob rippuvate orgude seeria, mis raskendab suurte väeosade läbimist vihmaste ilmade tõttu Elz oru läbimine veelgi keerulisemaks. Riegel am Kaiserstuhli ümbruskond on tuntud oma lössi ja kitsaste üleminekupunktide poolest, mis mõjutasid lahingut suuresti.

Suurem osa Prantsuse armeest debüteeris läbi Hölli oru. Desaixi vasakusse tiiba kuulusid Riegeli St. Suzanne'i diviisi üheksa pataljoni ja 12 eskadrilli, mis asusid Elzi mõlemal kaldal. Paremal, Malterdingeni ja Emmendingeni vahel, juhtis Beaupuy 12 pataljoni ja 12 eskadroni jagu. Paremale, Emmendingeni enda ja Heimbachi kõrgustesse, seisis Saint-Cyr selle ümber, ulatudes Duhesme'i diviisist (12 pataljoni ja kaheksa eskadrilli). Nendest paremal pool, Elzi orus Waldkirchi ääres seisis Amberti diviis ja Girardi brigaad Zähringeni ääres, umbes miil eemal, Lecourbe brigaad seisis reservis ja sealt põhja poole sirutades rändas linna lähedal 14 000 -liikmeline diviis. Holzhausen (tänapäeval märtsi osa, Breisgau). Need positsioonid lõid umbes pika joone. Lecorbe brigaadi kaugemal küljel seisid Ferino 15 pataljoni ja 16 eskadrilli, kuid need asusid Freiburg im Breisgaust lõuna- ja ida pool, trampides endiselt läbi mägede. Kõike olid takistanud tugevad vihmad, maapind oli pehme ja libe ning nii Reini kui ka Elzi jõgi olid üleujutatud, nagu ka paljud lisajõed. See suurendas rünnakute ohtu, sest hobused ei saanud head jalga. Johann Samuel Ersch
'' Allgemeine encyclopädie der wissenschaften und künste in alphabetischer foge von genannten schrifts bearbeitet und herausgegeben ''
Leipzig, J. F. Gleditsch, 1889, lk 64–66. Selle vastu seisis ertshertsogi vägi. Jõudes mõne miili kaugusele Emmendingenist, jagas ertshertsog oma jõu neljaks veeruks. Kolonnis Nauendorfis Elzi ülemises osas oli kaheksa pataljoni ja 14 eskadrilli, mis suundusid edelasse Waldkirchisse. Wartenslebenis oli 12 pataljoni ja 23 eskaadrit, kes liikusid lõunasse, et hõivata Elmi sild Emmendingenis. Latour koos 6000 mehega pidi ületama jalamile Heimbachi ja Malterdingeni kaudu ning vallutama Köndringeni silla Riegeli ja Emmendingeni vahel ning kolonn Fürstenberg hoidis Kinzingenit umbes Riegelist põhja pool. Frölichil ja Condé'l (osa Nauendorfi veerust) tehti ülesandeks Stiegi orus Ferino ja Prantsuse paremtiib maha suruda.

Esimesena Emmindingeni saabunud prantslased kindlustasid Waldkirchi kõrgpunkti, mis juhtis naaberorusid, mida sel ajal peeti sõjalise taktika maksimumiks, et mägede juhtimine andis orud kontrolli alla. 19. oktoobriks olid armeed vastamisi Elzi kaldal Waldkirchist Emmendingeni. Selleks ajaks teadis Moreau, et ei saa mööda Rehni paremat kallast Kehli poole liikuda, mistõttu otsustas ta ületada Reini põhja poole, Breisachi juurde. Sild oli seal aga väike ja kogu tema armee ei saanud kitsaskohta tekitamata üle sõita, mistõttu saatis ta sealt minema ainult Desaixi käsul oleva vasaku tiiva. Archibald Alison (Sir Archibald Alison, 1. parun) „Euroopa ajalugu”, ondon W. Blackwood ja pojad, 1835, lk 86 ja ndash90. Koidikul liikus Saint-Cyr (prantsuse paremal) mööda Elzi orgu edasi. Nauendorf valmistus oma Habsburgide vägesid orust alla viima. Seda nähes saatis Saint-Cyr väikese kolonni üle mägede põhiorust ida poole, külgorus asuvasse Simonswaldi külla. Ta käskis neil rünnata Nauendorfi vasakpoolset ja sundida teda Bleibachist lahkuma. Seda oodates oli Nauendorf aga juba Elzi oru kõrgustesse paigutanud üksused, kust Austria laskurid varitsesid Saint-Cyr'i mehi. Teisel pool Elzi orgu jõudis rohkem Habsburgide püssimehi Kollnausse, kust jäi Waldkirchile vaade ja sealt said nad Prantsuse vägede pihta tulistada. Võitlus oli kiire ja raevukas. Ülemad Austria positsioonid sundisid Saint-Cyr'i tühistama oma edasiliikumise Bleibachi vastu ja taanduma Waldkirchi isegi seal, kuigi Nauendorfi mehed jätkasid teda kiusamist ja Saint-Cyr taandus teise Denzlingeni ohutuse tagamiseks. Võitlus ei läinud paremaks nende vasakpoolsete prantslaste jaoks. Decaeni arenenud valvur liikus edasi, kuigi ettevaatlikult. Austria laskurid tulistasid kolonni ja Decaen kukkus vigastatult hobuse seljast alla. Beaupuy võttis koos eelvalvuriga Decaeni koha. Phipps, kd. II, lk 380 ja ndash385. Keskpäeval loobus Latour oma tavapärasest ettevaatlikkusest ja saatis kaks kolonni ründama Beaupuyt Malterdingeni ja Höllentali (Val d'Enfer) vahel, mille tulemuseks oli äge tulevahetus. Pärast Elzi ääres taandumiskäsu andmist tapeti Beaupuy ja tema diviis ei saanud käsku taganeda, põhjustades prantslastele lisakaotusi. Kesklinnas pidasid prantsuse laskurid Emmendingenist põhja pool Landecki metsas püsti kaks Wartenslebeni üksust, samal ajal kui tema kolmas võitles poriste, peaaegu läbimatute teede pärast. Wartenslebeni meestel oli vaja terve päev, et võidelda Emmendingeni ja tulistamise ajal purustas Wartenslebeni vasak käsi musketipall. Lõpuks saabus hilisõhtul Wartenslebeni kolmas kolonn, kes ähvardas ületada prantslaste parempoolsuse, prantslased taganesid üle Elzi jõe, hävitades nende taga olevad sillad. Alison, lk 86 ja ndash90 Phipps, kd. II, lk. 278. Päevase võitluse lõpus seisis Moreau vägi ebakindlas seisus. Vasakult paremale venitati prantslasi mööda sakilist, katkendlikku joont umbes. Decaeni diviis seisis Kaiserstuhli kirdenurgas Riegelis ja Endingenis ning enam ei saanud abi enamusele Moreau vägedele Moreau oli kaotanud Beaupuys ka energilise ja paljutõotava ohvitseri. Paremal seisis Saint-Cyr'i diviis Denzlingeni taga ja vasak venis Unterreute'i, õhuke joon eraldus ka keskusest Nimburgi juures (Tenningeni ja Landecki lähedal), poolel teel Riegeli ja Unterreute vahel. Prantsuse liin oli vaatamata Habsburgi kogu päeva edusammudele kirdesse austerlaste poole, koalitsiooniväed ei suutnud Prantsusmaa joont ääristada ja prantslased suutsid seetõttu lõunasse suhteliselt heas korras taganeda.

Märkused, tsitaadid ja ressursside tähestikuline loetelu

Ressursside tähestikuline loetelu

* Alison, Archibald (Sir Archibald Alison, 1. parun). '' Euroopa ajalugu. '' London: W. Blackwood ja pojad, 1835. *Blanning, Timothy. '' Prantsuse revolutsioonisõjad. '' New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, * Charles, Austria ertshertsog
'' Ausgewählte Schriften weiland seiner kaiserlichen Hoheit des Erzherzogs Carl von Österreich. ''
Viin, W. Braumüller, 1893–94. . * Dodge, Theodore Ayrault. „Sõda Napoleoni ajastul: revolutsioonilised sõjad esimese koalitsiooni vastu Põhja -Euroopas ja Itaalia kampaania, 1789–1797.” Leonaur, 2011.. * Dupuy, Roger. »La période jacobine: terreur, guerre et gouvernement révolutionnaire: 1792 & ndash1794", Pariis, Seuil, 2005. * Ersch, Johann Samuel
'' Allgemeine encyclopädie der wissenschaften und künste in alphabetischer foge von genannten schrifts bearbeitet und herausgegeben ''
Leipzig, J. F. Gleditsch, 1889. *Gates, David. Napoleoni sõjad 1803–1815, New York, Random House, 2011. *Graham, Thomas, parun Lynedoch
'' 1796. aasta kampaania ajalugu Saksamaal ja Itaalias. ''
London, 1797.. * Haythornthwaite, Philip. '' Austria armee Napoleoni sõdadest (1): jalavägi. '' Kirjastus Osprey, 2012. * Huot, Paul. '' Des Vosges au Rhin, ekskursioonid ja põhjuslikud teemad, '' Veuve Berger-Levrault & Fils, Pariis, 1868. * Phipps, Ramsay Weston. '' Esimese Prantsuse Vabariigi armeed: II köide Armées du Moselle, du Rhin, de Sambre-et-Meuse, de Rhin-et-Moselle ''. USA: Pickle Partners Publishing 2011. aasta originaalväljaande kordustrükk 1920–32. * Rickard, J.
'' Emmendingeni lahing ''
Sõja ajalugu
17. veebruar 2009. Kasutatud 18. novembril 2014. *Rothenburg, Gunther. "Habsburgide armee Napoleoni sõdades (1792–1815)". '' Military Affairs '', 37: 1 (veebruar 1973), lk 1–5. *Schroeder, Paul W. '' Transformation of Europe, 1763–1848 '', Clarendon, 1996, peatükid 2–3. * Smith, Digby. '' Napoleoni sõdade andmeraamat. '' Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 1999. * Wurzbach, Constant von. '' Biographisches Lexikon des Kaisertums Österreich '' 53. Viin, 1886. *Vann, James Allen. Švaabimaa kreis: institutsionaalne kasv Püha Rooma impeeriumis 1648–1715. LII, Rahvusvahelisele esindusasutuste ja parlamentaarsete institutsioonide ajaloo komisjonile esitatud uuringud. Bruxelles, 1975. *Walker, Mack. '' Saksa kodulinnad: kogukond, osariik ja üldvaldus, 1648–1871. ”Ithaca, 1998. <

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Veebisaidi kujunduse, koodi ja tehisintellekti kaitseb Stephen Payne (c) 2014-2017


Ameeriklased alistasid Yorktownis britid

Briti kindral lord Cornwallis loovutab lootusetult Virginia osariigis Yorktowni, loovutades 8000 Briti sõdurit ja meremeest suuremale Prantsuse-Ameerika väele, lõpetades tegelikult Ameerika revolutsiooni.

Lord Cornwallis oli Ameerika revolutsiooni üks võimekamaid Briti kindraleid. Aastal 1776 ajas ta kindral George Washingtoni ja#x2019s Patriots väed New Jerseyst välja ning 1780 võitis Lõuna -Carolinas Camdenis hämmastava võidu kindral Horatio Gatesi ja#x2019 Patriootide armee üle. Cornwallis ja sellele järgnev pealetung Põhja -Carolinasse oli siiski vähem edukas ning juhatas aprillis 1781 oma väsinud ja räsitud väed Virginia ranniku poole, kus ta sai säilitada merel asuvaid sideühendusi kindral Henry Clintoni suure Briti armeega New Yorgis. Linn. Pärast mitmeid reide Virginia linnade ja istanduste vastu korraldas Cornwallis augustis Yorktownis tõusulainevee linna. The British immediately began fortifying the town and the adjacent promontory of Gloucester Point across the York River.

General George Washington instructed the Marquis de Lafayette, who was in Virginia with an American army of around 5,000 men, to block Cornwallis’ escape from Yorktown by land. In the meantime, Washington’s 2,500 troops in New York were joined by a French army of 4,000 men under the Count de Rochambeau. Washington and Rochambeau made plans to attack Cornwallis with the assistance of a large French fleet under the Count de Grasse, and on August 21 they crossed the Hudson River to march south to Yorktown. Covering 200 miles in 15 days, the allied force reached the head of Chesapeake Bay in early September.

Meanwhile, a British fleet under Admiral Thomas Graves failed to break French naval superiority at the Battle of Virginia Capes on September 5, denying Cornwallis his expected reinforcements. Beginning September 14, de Grasse transported Washington and Rochambeau’s men down the Chesapeake to Virginia, where they joined Lafayette and completed the encirclement of Yorktown on September 28. De Grasse landed another 3,000 French troops carried by his fleet. During the first two weeks of October, the 14,000 Franco-American troops gradually overcame the fortified British positions with the aid of de Grasse’s warships. A large British fleet carrying 7,000 men set out to rescue Cornwallis, but it was too late.

On October 19, General Cornwallis surrendered 7,087 officers and men, 900 seamen, 144 cannons, 15 galleys, a frigate, and 30 transport ships. Pleading illness, he did not attend the surrender ceremony, but his second-in-command, General Charles O’Hara, carried Cornwallis’ sword to the American and French commanders. As the British and Hessian troops marched out to surrender, the British bands played the song “The World Turned Upside Down.”

Although the war persisted on the high seas and in other theaters, the Patriot victory at Yorktown effectively ended fighting in the American colonies. Peace negotiations began in 1782, and on September 3, 1783, the Treaty of Paris was signed, formally recognizing the United States as a free and independent nation after eight years of war.


Stock markets have the largest-ever one-day crash on "Black Monday"

The largest-ever one-day percentage decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average comes not in 1929 but on October 19, 1987. As a number of unrelated events conspired to tank global markets, the Dow dropped 508 points�.6 percent—in a panic that foreshadowed larger systemic issues.

Confidence on Wall Street had grown throughout the 1980s as the economy pulled out of a slump and President Ronald Reagan implemented business-friendly policies. In October 1987, however, indicators began to suggest that the bull market of the last five years was coming to an end. The government reported a surprisingly large trade deficit, precipitating a decline in the U.S. Dollar. Congress revealed it was considering closing tax loopholes for corporate mergers, worrying investors who were used to loose regulation.

As these concerns grew, Iran attacked two oil tankers off of Kuwait and a freak storm paralyzed England, closing British markets early on the Friday before the crash. The following Monday, U.S. investors awoke to news of turmoil in Asian and European markets, and the Dow began to tumble.

Further compounding the crash was the practice of program trading, the programming of computers to automatically execute trades under certain conditions. Once the rush to sell began, matters were quite literally out of traders’ hands and machines escalated the damage to the market.

Despite looking like the beginning of another Great Depression—the L.A. Times’ headline read �lam on Wall St.” while the New Yorgi päevauudised’ simply read “PANIC!,” Black Monday has been largely forgotten by Americans not versed in financial history. As it would again in 2008, the federal government took a number of measures to 𠇌orrect” the market, resulting in immediate gains over the next few weeks. By 1989, the market appeared to have made a full recovery. 

Some now interpret the events surrounding Black Monday as proof that boom-and-bust cycles are natural and healthy aspects of modern economics, while others believe it was a missed opportunity to examine and regulate the kind of risky behaviors that led to the crash of 2008.


“Take on Me” music video helps Norway’s A-ha reach the top the U.S. pop charts

From its beginnings in the early 1980s, it was clear that MTV, the Music Television Network, would have a dramatic effect on the way pop stars marketed their music and themselves. While radio remained a necessary engine to drive the sales and chart rankings of singles and albums, the rise of new artists like Duran Duran and the further ascent of established stars like Michael Jackson showed that creativity and esthetic appeal on MTV could make a direct and undeniable contribution to a musical performer’s commercial success. But if ever a case existed in which MTV did more than just contribute to an act’s success, it was the case of the Norwegian band a-Ha, who went from total unknowns to chart-topping pop stars almost solely on the strength of the groundbreaking video for the song “Take On Me,” which hit #1 on the Stend pop chart on October 19, 1985.

By 1985 the medium was established enough that it took a unique angle to achieve music video stardom. Enter a-Ha, a synth-pop group that caught a late ride on the dying New Wave thanks to the video for “Take On Me,” in which lead singer Morten Harket was transformed using a decades-old technology called Rotoscoping. The creators of the “Take On Me” video painted portions or sometimes the entirety of individual frames to create the effect of a dashingly handsome comic-book motorcycle racer (Harket) romancing a pretty girl from the real world, fighting off a gang of angry pursuers in a pipe-wrench fight before bursting out of the comic-book world as a dashingly handsome real boy.


A Forgotten Army The Irish Yeomanry

‘Peep O’Day Boys’, from Daly’s Ireland in 󈨦(1888). Despite the title the uniforms suggest that villians in the picture are Yeomanry, a reflection of their notoriety in folk memory.

In September 1796, Ireland was pregnant with expectation. The United Irishmen and Defenders planned insurrection and a French invasion was imminent. On 19 September Dublin Castle announced plans to follow Britain’s lead and enlist civilian volunteers as a yeomanry force. In October commissions were issued to local gentlemen and magistrates empowering them to raise cavalry troops and infantry companies. Recruits took the ‘Yeomanry oath’, were officered by the local gentry but were paid, clothed, armed and controlled by government. Their remit was to free the regular army and militia from domestic peacekeeping and do garrison duty if invasion meant troops had to move
to the coast. Service was part-time—usually two ‘exercise days’ per week—except during emergencies when they were called up on ‘permanent duty’.

Folk memory

If the Irish Yeomanry are remembered at all it is usually for their notoriety in the bloody summer of 1798. The popular folk memory of every area which saw action supplies lurid stories from the burning of Father John Murphy’s corpse in a tar barrel at Tullow to the sabreing and mutilation of Betsy Gray after the battle of Ballynahinch. Until recently, the Yeomen have been largely written out of history, apart from early nineteenth century polemics where they appear either as a brutal mob making ‘croppies’ lie down or latter day Williamite saviours. Such neglect belies the Irish Yeomanry’s real significance.
When Belfast’s White Linen Hall was demolished in 1896 to make way for City Hall a glass phial containing a scroll bearing Volunteer reform resolutions was found in its foundations. Two years later another demolition occurred. Ballynahinch loyalists smashed the monument on Betsy Gray’s grave to prevent a 1798 centenary celebration by Belfast Home Rulers. Volunteer radicalism was hermetically sealed in the past while the passions and polarisation engendered in the later 1790s lived and breathed. The Irish Yeomanry played a key role in this critical transition which saw ancient antipathies sharpen and re-assert their baleful influence after a period of relative calm. The ‘Age of Reason’ had briefly promised a brave new world in Ireland. In the 1780s, radical Volunteers favoured Catholic relief along with parliamentary reform. The Boyne Societies, founded to perpetuate the Williamite cause, charged toasting glasses rather than muskets. However the prospect of revolutionary change proved too much to swallow.

Flag of the Lower lveagh Yeoman Cavalry.
(Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the Ulster Museum, Belfast)

The force raised in 1796 actually bore much more resemblance to the Volunteers, praised by United Irish writers Myles Byrne and Charles Teeling, than to the reactionary and bigoted organisation portrayed in their rebellion histories. In reality, loyalism in 1796 was still a relatively broad church containing an ideological diversity and fluidity reminiscent of Volunteering days. Indeed, the Yeomanry were largely based on the same membership constituency, with frequent continuity of individual or family service. They certainly included the Williamite tradition found in some Volunteer corps but it also encompassed much of the democratic and indeed radical volunteering spirit. Election of officers was common everywhere. Dublin Yeomen, whom Henry Joy McCracken thought ‘liberal’, also elected their captains despite governmental opposition. Even in Armagh, the cockpit of Orangeism, Yeomen varied from Diamond veterans in the Crowhill infantry to radical ex-Volunteers enrolled by Lord Charlemont despite quibbles over the oath and the inclusion of some erstwhile francophiles who had recently erected a liberty tree.
In 1796, there was no inconsistency about this. Grattan dubbed the Yeomanry ‘an ascendancy army’ but in reality the United Irishmen were in the ascendant while the loyalist response was fragmented and in danger of being overwhelmed. The initial priority was defence: to trawl in all varieties of loyalty and provide a structure to prevent people being neutralised or becoming United Irishmen.

More Catholics than Orangemen

The new Yeomanry was therefore a surprisingly diverse force, given its subsequent reputation. The government denied any intention of excluding Catholics or Presbyterians but the system already had the potential for denominational

and ideological filtering. Being a Yeoman was a desirable position conveying social status plus pay, clothing, arms and training. Applications exceeded places, which were limited by financial and security considerations. This meant selection locally and government reliance on local landowners’ judgement.
Sometimes recruits had no choice. In some areas only Protestants volunteered, in others the Catholic Committee sabotaged Catholic enlistment. In Loughinsholin, where Presbyterians offered Catholics withdrew and vice-versa. Where there was competition to enter a limited number of corps, choices were unavoidable. Downshire allowed Catholics in his cavalry but faced mutually exclusive Protestant and Catholic infantry offers from the same parishes and opted for the former. In Orange areas, some landowners deliberately selected their Yeomen directly from the local lodge. Occasionally a precarious balance was attempted by including proportions of Catholic, Protestant and Dissenter. The Farney corps in Monaghan started this way. However the first levy produced a predominantly Anglican force. There were Presbyterian Yeomen in mid-Ulster but the strength of the United Irishmen in eastern counties meant relatively few corps were raised there in 1796.
Wealthy, property-owning Catholics, on the other hand, were admitted into cavalry corps. There was an element of tokenism in this: Yeomanry offers of service sometimes highlighted Catholic members, which they never did for the Protestant denominations. In this way it can be estimated that at the very least ten per cent of the first national levy of 20,000 Yeomen were Catholic, thus outnumbering the Orange yeomen who in 1796 were only to be found in some corps in the Orange districts of mid-Ulster.
Forming a Yeomanry force in the deteriorating conditions of 1796 gave the initiative briefly back to Dublin Castle but this disappeared in the crisis following the Bantry Bay invasion attempt. The United Irishmen drew great encouragement from its near success and felt themselves strong enough to switch their policy on the Yeomanry from intimidation to infiltration. As a response, purges of Yeomanry corps began in Ulster and Leinster in the spring of 1797.

Orange links

Many Catholics were expelled from corps in Wicklow and Wexford on suspicion of being ‘United’. In mid-Ulster General John Knox devised a ‘test oath’ obliging Yeomen to publicly swear they were not United Irishmen. This got results and several corps were cleared of disaffected members. The Presbyterian secretary of the Farney corps was expelled following his confession of United Irish membership while Catholics were removed on the pretext of a political resolution they had issued. Knox followed up the expulsions by permitting augmentations of Orangemen into some northern corps. Although Orangemen quietly joined some corps in 1796 this was the first time they had official approval.
Knox clinched this by engineering Orange resolutions for Castle consumption. This was a risky strategy, given the recent disturbances in Armagh. Knox, a correspondent of the radical MP Arthur O’Connor, privately disapproved of Orangeism but believed the dangerous predicament he faced merited utilising it as a short-term expedient. However, with the United Irish-Defender alliance growing, the precedent inherent in this strategy would have profound and lasting consequences. Almost immediately, symptoms of polarisation appeared. A Tyrone clergyman noted approvingly, ‘Our parties are all obviously merged into two: loyalists and traitors’.

Castlereagh’s secret policy

However the critical Yeomanry-Orange connection was still to come. By 1798 Orangeism had been adopted by many northern gentry and spread to Dublin where a framework national organisation was established. As insurrection loomed, this provided a ready-made supply of loyal manpower. There were around 18,000 Yeomen in Ulster whereas the Orangemen were conservatively reckoned at 40,000. In March the Dublin leaders offered the Ulster Orangemen to the government if it would arm them. The viceroy, Camden, was scared of offending Catholics in the Militia and hestitated. However, the appointment of an Irishman—Lord Castlereagh—as acting chief secretary offered a solution. On 16 April 1798 he ordered northern Yeomanry commanders to organise 5,000 ‘supplementary’ men to be armed in an emergency. Camden and Castlereagh had privately decided that, where possible, these would be Orangemen.
In tandem with the supplementary plan, regular Yeomen were given a more military role. They were put on permanent duty and integrated into contingency plans for garrisoning key towns at the outbreak of trouble. This had one very important side-effect. In the cramped conditions of garrison life and the panic occasioned by the influx of rural loyalists, Orangeism spread like wildfire amongst both Yeomanry and regular units. This spontaneous, ground-level spread of Orangeism operated simultaneously with Castlereagh’s secret emergency policy to utilise Orange manpower in Ulster. The Yeomanry system proved the ideal facilitator for both.

Drum of the Aughnahoe[County Tyrone] Yeoman Infantry. (Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the Ulster Museum, Belfast)

On 1 July 1798 in the Presbyterian town of Belfast, once the epicentre of United Irish activity, it was noted that ‘Every man…has a red coat on’. This would have been inconceivable in 1796 when there was great difficulty enlisting Yeomen. However, it was now government policy to separate northern Presbyterians from the United Irishmen. Again the Yeomanry played a key role. Castlereagh admitted privately that the arrest of the Down United colonel, William Steel Dickson was an exception to ‘the policy of acting against the Catholick [sic] rather than the Presbyterian members of the union [United Irishmen]’. Government supporters industriously spread news of the Scullabogue massacre (See HI Autumn 1996) to stir up atavistic fears. The Yeomanry was expanded considerably to meet the emergency and ex-radicals were no longer discouraged. In effect, the Yeomanry functioned as a safety net. Joining up offered an acceptable and very public ‘way back’ for wavering radicals. Although there were some Presbyterian Yeomen in 1796, many more joined in mid-1798. Charlemont’s friend, the Anglican clergyman Edward Hudson, exploited a ‘schism’ between Presbyterian and Catholic to enlist the former in his Portglenone corps, sardonically noting ‘the brotherhood of affection is over’. By 1799, he claimed ‘the word “Protestant”, which was becoming obsolete in the north, has regained its influence and all of that description seem drawing closer together’. Thus the Yeomanry oath was often a rite of passage for Presbyterians keen to end their flirtation with revolution.

The 1798 rebellion had a profound impact on the psyche of Protestant Ireland, conjuring up anew spectres of 1641. When news of the rising hit Dublin, Camden described the apocalyptic atmosphere to Pitt. The rebellion

literally made the Protestant part of this country mad…it is scarcely possible to restrain the violence of my own immediate friends and advisors…they are prepared for extirpation and any appearance of lenity…raises a flame which runs like wildfire thro’ the streets.

Mercy was indeed scarce until Cornwallis replaced Camden and the rebellion was effectively crushed. Up to this juncture, the interests of most Protestants and the government were running parallel, a partnership potently symbolised by the Yeomanry, now blooded in the rebellion. Many embattled Protestants saw the parallel interests as identical: through the smouldering fires of rebellion they confused expediency with permanent policy.
Cornwallis, a professional soldier, voiced his contempt for the barbarity of the local amateur forces, particularly the Yeomanry. For many, criticism of the Yeomanry was construed as attacking Protestant interests. Yeomanry service under Camden and the relationship it represented was now seen as an unalterable ‘gold standard’. When government policy ran counter to perceived Protestant interests, loyalty was qualified with distrust and a feeling of betrayal. Camden was toasted as ‘the father of the Yeomanry’ while Cornwallis was lampooned as ‘Croppywallis’.

Lt. Col. William Blacker, Yeoman and Oraneman
(Dublin University Magazine 1841)

The Yeomanry and the Union

When it emerged that Pitt intended legislative union, antagonism towards Cornwallis sharpened. As union would remove emancipation from Ireland’s control, ultra-Protestant loyalty faced a severe test. Many Yeomen and Orangemen opposed the measure, particularly in Dublin where lawyers and merchants also faced a loss of professional and mercantile status. The Yeomanry, which it was claimed saved Ireland in 1798, were at the cutting edge of the anti-union campaign. A mutiny was threatened in Dublin with Volunteer-type rhetoric, but the bluster of 1782 proved hot air in post-rebellion Ireland. In the last analysis Protestants depended on the Yeomanry and the Yeomen depended on the government. The consequences of disbandment made union seem the lesser evil. Cornwallis rushed reinforcements to Dublin but the bluff had called itself.
Jonah Barrington later claimed the Volunteers were loyal to their country [Ireland] and their king while the Yeomen looked to ‘the king of England and his ministers’. Barrington’s jibe about patriotism was the peevish reaction of an incorrigible anti-unionist, yet a subtle alteration in the nature and focus of loyalty had occurred. The Volunteers’ ‘patriotism’ flourished in an atmosphere where they faced no real internal threat. While many Yeomen opposed the abolition of the Irish parliament, the experience of 1798 made challenging the executive a luxury they could not afford. On the surface, the switch of loyalty from College Green to Dublin Castle seemed relatively smooth: Yeomanry corps quickly adopted the post-1800 union flag in their colours. Yet, alongside this, a new focus of loyalty emerged to co-exist with this sometimes grudging allegiance. The ‘Protestant nationalism’ of 1782 was transformed into a clenching loyalty to the increasingly insecure interests of Irish Protestants.

Politicisation and Protestantism

The Yeomanry soon became a major component in post-union politics, a conduit between government and substantial numbers of Protestants who increasingly saw the force as symbolising the survival of their social and political position. They functioned as a political tool. When Hardwicke, the new viceroy, wanted to send a conciliatory message to nervous Protestants he reviewed the entire Dublin Yeomanry in Phoenix Park, then lavished hospitality on the officers in a banquet afterwards. It was a two-way process: Protestants could use the Yeomanry to put government in their debt. The continuance of war in 1803 meant a large increase in the Yeomanry from 63,000 to around 80,000. Emmet’s rising, coming when this augmentation was on foot, gave Protestants another opportunity to appear indispensable by extending their monopoly of the Yeomanry. The means by which this was accomplished ranged from high-level manoeuvring to parish pump politics.
As a partisan Yeomanry would be viewed in a poor light at Westminster, Hardwicke attempted a balance by considering some purely Catholic corps. However the Louth MP Fortesque threatened impeachment if he proceeded. Even the chief secretary, Wickham, considered Catholic corps ‘unsafe’ as they would inflame loyalist opinion and ‘be not cried but roared out against throughout all Ireland’. At a local level, Arthur Browne, the Prime Sergeant of Limerick, observed that Yeomanry corps in each town he passed on circuit effectively excluded Catholics by submitting prospective recruits to a ballot of existing members. This said, the Protestant monopoly was never total. Catholic Yeomen remained in areas of sparse Protestant settlement like Kerry. Moreover, there was still a scattering of liberal Protestants, usually at officer level, like Lieutenant Barnes of the Armagh Yeomanry. However, the general tendency was clear. When it became known Barnes had signed an emancipation petition, the privates mutinied and flung down their arms.

In the early nineteenth century, the passions generated by 1798 mixed with the politics of the Catholic Question. The continued existence of the Yeomanry allowed Protestants to demonstrate that their traditional control of law and order was intact as the campaign for emancipation built up. Yeomanry parades and the use of the force in assisting magistrates with mundane law and order matters assumed great symbolic importance as tangible manifestations of the fractures in Irish society. Yeomanry corps inevitably became involved in local clashes in an increasingly sectarianised atmosphere. In 1807, the government prevented Enniscorthy Yeomen celebrating the anniversary of the battle of Vinegar Hill as it raised sectarian tensions. In 1808 Yeomen were among a mob which disrupted a St John’s Eve bonfire and ‘garland’ near Newry, provoking a riot in which one man died. During the disturbances which swept Kerry and Limerick the same year, isolated Protestant Yeomen were singled out for attacks and arms raids. Since penal times, possession or dispossession of arms scored political points. Protestant insecurity and Catholic alienation fed off each other. O’Connell, ironically once a Yeoman himself, upped the ante by lambasting the force as symbolising a partisan magistracy.
The Yeomanry presented governments with a dilemma: was their strategic utility worth the political price? While war with France continued and the regular army was depleted for overseas service, they provided an important source of additional manpower and were particularly useful during invasion scares when they could free up the remaining regular garrison and maintain a local presence to deter co-ordinated action by the disaffected. Moreover, they served an unofficial purpose by keeping potentially turbulent Protestants under discipline.
The decision was deferred and the dilemma submerged. For much of the 1820s the Yeomanry lingered on, a rather moribund force seen by officials as a liability which could not be disbanded for fear of a Protestant reaction, particularly in Ulster where the force was numerically strongest. The advent of the denominationally inclusive County Constabulary in 1822 further touched Protestant insecurity by removing much of the functional justification for Yeomanry. There was no love lost between the two forces. In 1830 William McMullan of the Lurgan infantry was arrested by his own captain, yelling at the head of a mob rioting against the police, ‘we have plenty of arms and ammunition and can use them as well as you’. Ironically in that year the Whig chief secretary, Stanley, had decided to re-clothe and re-arm the Yeomanry as part of the response to the southern Tithe War. Stanley’s experiment proved disastrous as sectarian clashes developed.
In some districts the sight of a red coat was like a red rag to a bull. In 1831, the rescue of two heifers destrained for tithe sparked an appalling incident in Newtownbarry. A mob of locals tried to release the cattle, the magistrates called for Yeomanry and stones were thrown. When one Yeoman fell with a fractured skull, the others opened fire killing fourteen countrymen. The viceroy, Anglesey, tried to limit the political damage by initiating a progressive dismantling of the Yeomanry starting with a stand-down of the permanent sergeants which meant the Yeomen could no longer drill. This phasing-out took three years and was intentionally gradual, starving the Yeomanry of the oxygen of duty and pay, thus letting them pass away naturally if not gracefully. It was rightly felt this approach would be less likely to provoke a political reaction than sudden disbandment which, for a Protestant community coming to terms with emancipation, would have been like an amputation without anaesthetic.

Yeomanry belt plates – Glenauly [County Fermanagh]
Infantry and Belfast Merchant’s Crops. (Reproduced with the kind permission of the Trustees of the Ulster Museum, Belfast)

Although the Yeomanry’s official existence ended in 1834, the last rusty muskets were not removed from their dusty stores till the early 1840s. With unintentional but obvious symbolism, they were escorted to the ordnance stores by members of the new constabulary. Although gone, the Yeomen were most certainly not forgotten. For one thing, they were seen as the most recent manifestation of a tradition of Protestant self-defence stretching back to plantation requirements of armed service from tenants then re-surfacing in different forms such as the Williamite county associations, the eighteenth-century Boyne Societies, anti-Jacobite associations of 1745 and the Volunteers. Such identification had been eagerly promoted. At the foundation of an Apprentice Boys’ club in 1813, Colonel Blacker, a Yeoman and Orangeman, amalgamated the siege tradition, the Yeomanry and 1798 in a song entitled The Crimson Banner:

Again when treason maddened round,
and rebel hordes were swarming,
were Derry’s sons the foremost found,
for King and Country arming.

Moreover, the idea of a yeomanry remained as a structural template for local, gentry-led self-defence, particularly in Ulster. When volunteering was revived in Britain in 1859, northern Irish MPs like Sharman Crawford tried unsuccessfully to use the Yeomanry precedent to get similar Irish legislation. Yeomanry-like associations were mooted in the second Home Rule crisis of 1893. The Ulster Volunteer Force of 1911-14—often led by the same families like Knox of Dungannon—defined their role like Yeomen, giving priority to local defence and exhibiting great reluctance to leave their own districts for training in brigades.
The strong Orange-Yeomanry connection—itself part of a wider process of militarisation in Irish society—has left an enduring imprint on Orangeism which can be seen in the marching fife and drum bands and in various military regalia such as ceremonial swords and pikes. Even the name is still retained by the Moira Yeomanry Loyal Orange Lodge. The town or parish basis of Yeomanry corps mirrored the dynamics of the plantations and helped catapult the territorial mind-set of both ‘planter’ and ‘native’ into the nineteenth century and beyond. Weekly Yeomanry parades defined territory in the same way as rural drumming parties in the nineteenth century and marches, murals and coloured kerbstones in the twentieth.

Alan Blackstock works in the Public Records Office, Northern Ireland.

The formation of the Orange Order, 1795-98: the edited papers of Colonel William Blacker and Colonel Robert H. Wallace (Belfast 1994).

T. Bartlett, The Fall and Rise of the Irish Nation (Dublin 1992).

G. Broeker, Rural Disorder and Police Reform in Ireland, 1812-36 (London 1970).

H. Senior, Orangeism in Ireland and Britain, 1795-1836 (London and Toronto 1966).


Battle of Emmendingen, 19 October 1796 - History

This is a finding aid. It is a description of archival material held in the Wilson Library at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Unless otherwise noted, the materials described below are physically available in our reading room, and not digitally available through the World Wide Web. See the Duplication Policy section for more information.

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Suurus 1.0 feet of linear shelf space (approximately 372 items)
Abstraktne Edmund Walter Jones (1811-1876) was a planter at Clover Hill in Happy Valley in Caldwell County, N.C. Early items in the collection are chiefly business and surveying papers of Edmund Walter Jones's father-in-law, William Davenport. The bulk of the papers is business and family correspondence of Jones, including letters from Lenoir, Jones, Patterson, and Avery relatives commenting on personal and public affairs papers related to E. W. Jones's speculation in military bounty lands in the Midwest wartime letters from his sons, William Davenport (b. 1839), John Thomas (1842-1864) and Walter L. (d. 1863), both of whom served in the 26th North Carolina Regiment, and Edmund (1848-1920), written from various locations in North Carolina and Virginia and a few letters from sons John Thomas and Edmund while students at the University of North Carolina. The postwar papers pertain to Edmund (1848-1920), planter in Happy Valley, lawyer in Lenoir, N.C., and state legislator. Volumes include land, surveying, and financial records of William Davenport, including a field survey book (typed transcript only), 1821, of the boundary line between North Carolina and Tennessee a memorandum book kept by Edmund Jones (1771-1844), father of Edmund Walter Jones, on a trip to Alabama in 1816 miscellaneous accounts and memoranda of E. W. Jones, including accounts of the building of Clover Hill and a clothing records for Company I, 26th North Carolina Regiment.
Looja Jones, Edmund Walter, 1811-1876.
Keel Inglise
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The following terms from Library of Congress Subject Headings suggest topics, persons, geography, etc. interspersed through the entire collection the terms do not usually represent discrete and easily identifiable portions of the collection--such as folders or items.

Clicking on a subject heading below will take you into the University Library's online catalog.

  • Avery family.
  • Bounties, Military--United States--History--Mexican War, 1846-1848.
  • Clover Hill Plantation (Caldwell County, N.C.)
  • College students--North Carolina--Social life and customs.
  • Ameerika Konföderatsiooni osariigid. Army--Military life.
  • Ameerika Konföderatsiooni osariigid. Army. North Carolina Infantry Regiment, 26th.
  • Davenport, William, fl. 1789-1821.
  • Family--North Carolina--Social life and customs.
  • Happy Valley (Caldwell County, N.C.)
  • Jones family.
  • Jones, Edmund Walter, 1811-1876.
  • Jones, Edmund, 1771-1844.
  • Jones, Edmund, 1848-1920.
  • Jones, John Thomas, 1842-1864.
  • Jones, Walter L., d. 1863.
  • Jones, William Davenport, b. 1839.
  • Jones, William Davenport, b. 1839.
  • Lawyers--North Carolina--History--19th century.
  • Lenoir (N.C.)--History--19th century.
  • Lenoir family.
  • North Carolina--Boundaries--Tennessee.
  • North Carolina--History--Civil War, 1861-1865.
  • North Carolina--Politics and government--1865-1950.
  • Patterson family.
  • Plantations--North Carolina--Caldwell County.
  • Real estate investment--United States--History--19th century.
  • Soldiers--Confederate States of America--Correspondence.
  • Southern States--Description and travel.
  • Surveyors--North Carolina--History.
  • Tennessee--Boundaries--North Carolina.
  • University of North Carolina (1793-1962)--Students--History--19th century.
  • Virginia--History--Civil War, 1861-1865.

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Edmund Walter Jones of Clover Hill, situated about six miles north of Lenoir in Caldwell County, N.C., was the son of Edmund Jones and his wife Ann Lenoir Jones of Palmyra. His grandfathers were William Lenoir and George Jones. Edmund Walter Jones married his cousin Sophia Caroline Davenport, daughter of William Davenport and his wife Mary Lenoir Gordon Davenport of The Fountain (or Walnut Fountain). All of these homes were located in Happy Valley in Caldwell County, N.C. Edmund Walter and Sophia Jones had four sons and one daughter: Colonel John T. Jones, who was killed at the Battle of the Wilderness on 6 May 1864 Private Walter L. Jones, who was mortally wounded at Gettysburg Captain William Davenport Jones, a member of General Collet Leventhorpe's staff who was also wounded and Edmund Jones, legislator and lawyer. Colonel John Thomas Jones served in the 1st North Carolina Volunteers and then as an officer in the 26th North Carolina Regiment under Zebulon B. Vance and Henry K. Burgwyn, and in the brigade of James Johnston Pettigrew. He was a lieutenant colonel when he was killed at the Battle of the Wilderness. Walter L. Jones attended Hillsboro Military Academy in 1860, became a soldier, and was killed at Gettysburg. Edmund Jones (1848-1920), called Edmund Jones, Jr. and nicknamed Coot, studied at Bingham Academy, served briefly in the 3rd North Carolina Cavalry in 1865, and after the war studied at the University of North Carolina and the University of Virginia. In later years, he farmed at Clover Hill, practiced law in Lenoir, and served in the N.C. legislature.

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The earlier papers are chiefly business and surveying papers of Edmund Walter Jones's father-in-law William Davenport. The bulk of the papers is business and family correspondence of Jones, including letters from Lenoir, Jones, Patterson, and Avery relatives commenting on personal and public affairs papers related to E. W. Jones's speculation in military bounty lands in the Midwest and wartime letters from his sons, William Davenport Jones, John Thomas Jones (1842-1864) and Walter L. Jones (d. 1863), both of whom served in the 26th North Carolina Regiment, and Edmund Jones (1848-1920), written from various locations in North Carolina and Virginia and a few letters from sons John Thomas and Edmund while students at the University of North Carolina. The postwar papers pertain to Edmund (1848-1920), planter in Happy Valley, N.C., lawyer in Lenoir, N.C., and state legislator.

Volumes include land, surveying, and financial records of William Davenport, including a field survey book (typed transcript only), 1821, of the boundary line between North Carolina and Tennessee a memorandum book kept by Edmund Jones (1771-1844), father of Edmund Walter Jones, on a trip to Alabama in 1816 miscellaneous accounts and memoranda of E. W. Jones, including accounts of the building of Clover Hill Plantation and a clothing records for Company I, 26th North Carolina Regiment.


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