Juhendatud pommid

Juhendatud pommid

Saksa teadlased alustasid juhitavate pommidega katsetamist enne Teise maailmasõja puhkemist. Pommi Fritz-X kasutati esmakordselt 1943. aasta septembris. 1400 kg kaaluv soomust läbistav pomm oli väikeste tiibade ja juhtmehhanismi sisaldava sabaüksusega. Seda juhtis kukkumise ajal lennuki vaatleja, kes edastas raadiolingi kaudu käske. Selle lennuulatus oli kaheksa miili ja see oli nii kiire, et õhutõrjekahurid pidasid võimatuks neid tabada. Nagu ka lahingulaeva uputamine Roma see kahjustas tugevalt ka Briti sõjalaeva Sõjaaegne 1943. aastal.

Ameerika Ühendriigid töötasid ka sõja hilisemates etappides välja juhitava pommi VB-1. 1000 lb raketil oli paar raadio teel juhitavat rooli, millega pommitaja pärast lennukis kukkumist manipuleeris. visuaalse juhise andmiseks kasutati pommisaba raketti. Täiustatud VB-3 kaugust saab reguleerida ka laskumisnurga muutmisega.


Täpselt juhitav laskemoon

Kuna plahvatusohtlike relvade kahjustusmõju pöördkuubiseaduse tõttu kaugusega väheneb, võimaldavad isegi tagasihoidlikud täpsuse parandused (seega ka kauguse vähendamine) sihtmärki rünnata vähemate või väiksemate pommidega. Seega, isegi kui mõned pommid lähevad mööda, seatakse ohtu vähem lennumeeskondi ning kahju tsiviilelanikele ja tagatiskahju võib väheneda.

Täpselt juhitava laskemoona tulek tõi kaasa vanemate pommide ümbernimetamise "gravitatsioonipommideks", "tummapommideks" või "raudpommideks".


Põhja -Vietnami sild, mille hävitamiseks kulus seitse aastat

Hanoist lõuna pool asuv maantee- ja raudteesild ulatus Ma jõe äärde ning oli oluline lüli kommunistlike vägede ja varude liikumisel. Suurema osa kümnendist trotsisid USA mereväe, merejalaväe ja õhujõudude lendurid Põhja-Vietnami kohal helvestega täidetud taevast missioonidel hävitada kohalike elanike poolt „Draakoni lõualuuks” ristitud 56 jala laiune sild ja katkestada see seos. . Draakoni lõualuu: eepiline lugu julgusest ja sitkusest Vietnamis, kõrval New York Times enimmüüdud autor Bridge ja tuntud lennundusajaloolane Barrett Tillman, kroonib seda eepilist kampaaniat, mille varased ebaõnnestumised said Põhja -Vietnami otsustavuse ja vastupanu Ameerika õhujõule.

Algselt prantslased ehitasid selle koloniaalperioodil, silla hävitasid 1945. aastal kommunistide juhitud Viet Minhi väed, kes võitlesid iseseisvuse eest, ning asendati tugevama konstruktsiooniga, mis avati 1964. aastal. Ameerika sõjaväeplaneerijad võtsid operatsioonis Rolling Thunder vastu draakoni lõualuu. 2. märtsil 1965 algatatud pommitamiskampaania vaenlase transporditeede sulgemiseks.

Tais asuvad õhujõudude F-105D Thunderchiefs ründasid 1965. aasta aprillis kaks korda Dragon's Jaw'i, lõhkudes seda 348 pommi ja raketiga. Rünnakud puhusid välja betoonitükke, kraatrisid konstruktsiooni lähenemised ja ajutiselt katkestasid maantee- ja raudteeliikluse üle Ma jõe, kuid sild keeldus kukkumast.

Nii maismaa- kui ka kandjalennukid jätkasid silla ründamist edutult. Ainuüksi mais 1966 lasid mereväe piloodid Dragon's lõualuu ümber ja selle ümbruses 128 tonni laskemoona ning jaanuari ja märtsi 1967 vahel tehti silla vastu vähemalt 30 õhurünnakut. Kuid pärast igat streiki ilmusid Põhja -Vietnami meeskonnad kohusetundlikult kontrollima ja parandage kahjustused. Tundus, et ameeriklased olid võimelised silla välja lööma vaid mõneks päevaks. "Mõtlesime Hanoisse helistada," naljatas üks mereväe piloot, "ja ütlesime, et lükkame kolm A-4 [Skyhawksi] üle parda, kui nad selle kuradi silla õhku lasevad!"

Coonts ja Tillman väidavad, et Ameerika sõjavägi oli Draakoni tapmiseks üllatavalt halvasti varustatud. USA lennumeeskonnad olid relvastatud peamiselt alamõõdulise tavalise laskemoonaga, "tummade" pommidega, millel puudus täpsus ja löök betoonist sammastega tugevdatud terasest sõrestikusilla hävitamiseks. Pilootid teatasid, et vaid pooled nende pommidest maandusid sihtmärgist 450 jala raadiuses ja laskemoonaanalüütikud leidsid, et silla lammutamiseks on vaja võimsamaid relvi-mitte tavalisi 500-, 750- ja 1000-naeliseid pomme.

Töö veelgi raskemaks muutmine oli Põhja -Vietnami keerukas kaitse. Pilvede vahelt alla lennanud Ameerika lennukid pidid laskma mütsi MiG hävitajaid, maa-õhk rakette ja radariga juhitavaid õhutõrjekahureid. 1968. aasta lõpuks oli Põhja-vietnamlane suurendanud õhutõrjerelvade arvu 700-lt 1965. aastal enam kui 8000-ni.

Thanh Hoa sild, kirjutage Coonts ja Tillman, „sai Põhja -Vietnami kõige enam kaitstud sihtmärgiks, mis on tol ajal inimkonna ajaloos kõige tugevamalt kaitstud sihtmärk maa peal”.

President Lyndon B. Johnson, kes loodab ehk mõjutada rahuprotsessi Kagu -Aasias, lõpetas 31. oktoobril 1968 Rolling Thunderi, lõpetades silla vastu suunatud õhurünnakud. Pommitamiskampaania käigus oli Draakoni lõualuu rünnates kadunud 12 lennukit - 13 õhuväelast olid surnud või kadunud. Põhja -Vietnami vangistati veel seitse ja vangistati aastaid, mõnda piinati kurikuulsas Hanoi Hiltonis.

President Richard Nixon jätkas järk -järgult õhutegevust Põhja -Vietnami vastu. Ta lubas 1971. aastal uuesti õhurünnakud Thanh Hoa piirkonnas ja laiendas pärast kommunistlikku ülestõusmispühade pealetungi 30. märtsil 1972 operatsiooni Linebacker I abil õhusõda, et see hõlmaks kogu Põhja-Vietnami. Koormatud spetsiaalselt ehitatud 3000-naeliste laseriga juhitavate pommidega- täppismoonad, mis muudaksid revolutsiooni õhusõjas-õhuväe hävitajad-pommitajad ründasid mais Draakoni lõualuu ja peaaegu hävitasid selle. Sel oktoobril andis mereväe A-7 Corsairs laser- ja elektrooptiliste juhitavate pommidega riigipöörde.

Meeldiv põnevust pakkuv gaasipedaal, Draakoni lõualuu tabab teravalt Vietnami õhuvõitluse terrorit, kangelaslikkust ja ohverdusi. ✯


Uuringud ja allikad

"Operatsioon Linebacker I 1972 Esimene kõrgtehnoloogiline õhusõda", autor Marshall L. Michel III, kirjastus Osprey (ePub-väljaanne), 2019
"Rolling Thunder 1965-1968 Vietnami vastuolulisim õhukampaania", autor Richard P. Hallion, kirjastus Osprey (ePub-väljaanne), 2018
"Linebacker The Untold Story of Air Reids Over North Vietnam", Karl J. Eschmann, Lume Books (Kindle edition), 2018
"Pikk tee kõrbetormini ja kaugemale", autor major Donald L. Blackwelder, Õhujõudude Uuringute Kool, mai 1992
"Teise põlvkonna relvad SEA -s", peakorteri PACAF direktoraat, taktikalise hindamise projekt CHECO SEA aruanne, 10. september 1970
"Linebacker Operations September - December 1972", Project CHECO Office of History HQ PACAF 31. detsember 1978


Juhitavad raketid, ekslikud poliitikad ja suuna muutmine või kuidas ma õppisin lõpetama muretsemise ja armastuse

Aitäh et mind kutsusid. Mulle meeldib lühidalt rääkida ja kulutada palju aega küsimustele ja vastustele. Alustuseks soovin kaaluda seda küsimust: kui vastab tõele, et hullumeelsus on ühiskondades tavalisem kui üksikisikutel ja kui ühiskond, kus me elame, kiirendab agressiivselt (nagu ma arvan, on hästi välja kujunenud) kliima kokkuvarisemist, siis ökosüsteemi laastamine , rikkuse ebavõrdsus ja institutsionaalne korruptsioon (teisisõnu protsessid, mis on selgelt vastuolus teadlike, välja öeldud soovidega), kas see ühiskond pole ehk reegli erand? On see ehk hull? Ja kas võib -olla on ka muid omavahel seotud hullumeelsusi, mida me ei näe täiesti selgelt, just seetõttu, et oleme selle ühiskonna liikmed?

Kuidas oleks, kui lukustada tohutult palju inimesi puuridesse kuludega, mis on palju suuremad kui neile hea elu andmine? Kuidas oleks loodusele, energiale ja ressurssidele pühendada loomade toitmine inimeste toitmiseks, kasutades toitu, mis oleks võinud toita kümme korda rohkem inimesi ilma keskkonna hävitamise ja loomade julmusega? Aga relvastatud ja väljaõppinud tapjate kasutamine, et öelda inimestele, et nad sõidavad liiga kiiresti ega tohi jalgrattaga kõnniteel liikuda? Kas võib juhtuda, et paljud asjad, mida mõistlikum kultuur nimetaks lollusteks, näevad meile sama tavalised kui põletavad nõiad, veritsevad patsiendid ja eugeeniliselt imeliste imikute eksponeerimine teistele varem?

Mis siis, kui pole lihtsalt püsivalt ja üldiselt universaalne ja ratsionaalne võtta kõik meetmed, mida tuuma -apokalüpsise kiirendamiseks võetakse? Meil on teadlasi, kes ütlevad, et katastroof on praegu tõenäolisem kui kunagi varem ja et selle olemus oleks hullem kui kunagi varem mõistetud. Meil on ajaloolasi, kes ütlevad, et lähisõite on rohkem kui kunagi varem teada. Ja ometi on meil meediaväljaanded, mis teavitavad kõiki, et probleem kadus 30 aastat tagasi. Meil on USA valitsus heitnud tohutuid aardeid tuumarelvade ehitamiseks, keeldudes neid esmakordselt kasutamast ja öelnud, et need on kasutuskõlblikud. ” korda, kui olemasolevad tuumarelvade varud suudaksid kõrvaldada kogu elu maa peal, on vähenenud ja#8212, kui suudate seda vääriliselt väljendada “ põhjus. ” Suur osa maailmast nõuab tuumarelvade likvideerimist, teine ​​tükk aga maailm kaitseb nende tootmist, levitamist ja tavapäraseid ohte nende kasutamisel. On selge, et kellelgi on õigus ja keegi on hull. Kellegi all pean silmas tervet ühiskonda, mitte selle üksikisikuid ja hoolimata eranditest.

Kuidas on lood inimeste tapmise ideega? Vangide tapmine, et õpetada neid inimesi mitte tapma? Tapetakse inimesi, kes näevad kauge videokaamera vaatenurgast nagu täiskasvanud mees vales kohas ja mobiiltelefoni läheduses, keda kahtlustatakse kuulumises kellelegi, kellele ei meeldi, pluss kõik mehed ja naised ning lapsed, kes juhuslikult lähedal asuvad? Tapate inimesi, kes ületavad piiri ja jooksevad relvastatud võitlejate eest? Inimeste tapmine, kes satuvad politsei teele ja näevad välja nagu nende nahal oleks natuke liiga palju pigmenti? Mis siis, kui kogu nende inimeste tapmise praktikas on midagi valesti? Mis siis, kui see oleks sama hull kui arstid, kes veritsesid George Washingtoni surnuks või Phil Collins uskus, et ta suri Alamo juures, või Joe Bideni idee, et USA valitsus ei sekku teiste riikide valimistesse ?

Mis siis, kui inimeste tapmine on kahtlemata naljakas isegi kujuteldava stsenaariumi korral, kus ÜRO on andnud loa heale humanitaarsõjale ja tapetavad inimesed kannavad kõik vormiriietust ning kedagi ei piinata ega vägistata ega rüüstata ning iga mõrv on ülimalt lugupidav ja vihast ja vaenust vaba? Mis siis, kui probleemiks on rahu hoolikas vältimine, millega iga sõda alguse saab, mitte aga julmuste üksikasjad? Mis siis, kui “ sõjakuriteod ” kui fraas avalikult palju öelda, et keegi ei arvaks, et olete fašist või vabariiklane, on tegelikult sama mõttetu kui “orjusekuriteod ” või “massi-vägistamiskuriteod ”, sest sõda on kuritegu tervikuna? Mis siis, kui iga aastakümnete pikkune sõda on tegelikult ebaproportsionaalselt tapnud nn valesid inimesi, vanureid, väga noori, tsiviilisikuid? Mis siis, kui pole midagi hullemat kui sõda, mida saab kasutada sõja õigustamiseks? Mis siis, kui sõjad tekivad peamiselt sõdade ja sõdadeks valmistumise tõttu? Kui see oleks tõsi ja#8212 ning ma oleksin valmis vaidlema iga väite üle, et see pole nii, siis poleks triljoneid dollareid investeerimisel midagi natuke häbelikku täis tekiga mängimisel sõjamasinates?

World BEYOND War veebisaidil esitatud juhtum seisneb muidugi selles, et raha suunamine sõjaettevalmistustesse, mis muudavad inimesed vähem turvaliseks, mitte turvalisemaks, tapab ise tunduvalt rohkem inimesi, kui on tapetud kõigis senistes sõdades. Selleks võtame me ilma asjadest, millele oleksime võinud raha kulutada, näiteks toidust, veest, ravimitest, peavarju, riietusest jne. ja rassism, et sõda ja selle ettevalmistamine laastavad looduslikku maad, et sõda on ainus ja ainus vabandus valitsuse saladuse hoidmiseks, et sõjabaasid ja relvamüük ning tasuta väljaõpe ja rahastamine toetavad kohutavalt rõhuvaid valitsusi, et sõjaäri hävitab tsiviilotstarbe. vabadusi mõne salapärase aine nimel, mida nimetatakse "vabaduseks", ja see sõda karastab kultuuri, militariseerides samal ajal politsei ja meeled, ja kui see kõik on tõsi, siis sõda, mida hullusest nakatunud kutsuvad 8220kaitsetööstus ja#8221 võivad olla lihtsalt kõige koocoo -konfabulatsioon, mis eales välja mõeldud.

Seda ma ütlesin miljard korda. Ja miljard ja viis korda vastasin ma II maailmasõja eksitusele, mille kohta te kõik küsite kohe, kui ma suu kinni panen. Ei, II maailmasõjal polnud mingit pistmist kellegi päästmisega ühestki surmalaagrist. USA ja liitlasvalitsused keeldusid selgesõnaliselt juute Saksamaalt vastu võtmast ning avalikult antisemiitlikel põhjustel. Kunagi ei astutud samme laagrite mõrvade peatamiseks. Sõda tappis laagrite toiminguid mitu korda. Sõda tekkis pärast aastaid kestnud lääneriikide võidurelvastumist Jaapaniga ja natsi -Saksamaa toetamist. USA korporatsioonid toetasid kriitiliselt natsisid kogu sõja vältel kasumi ja ideoloogilistel põhjustel. Põhjamaade võidusõidu jama ja segregatsiooniseadused ning suur osa hävitamise inspiratsioonist ja tehnoloogiast pärinesid Ameerika Ühendriikidest. Tuumapomme polnud millekski vaja. Miski Teise maailmasõja kohta ei tõesta, et vägivalda oleks vaja millekski. Ja kui seda oleks vaja natsismi vastu võitlemiseks, poleks palju tippnatside palkamist USA sõjaväkke olnud mõtet. Vaata minu raamatut Teise maailmasõja mahajätmine pika versiooni jaoks.

Nüüd ma tahan öelda midagi veelgi hullemat. Või kui mul on õigus, tahan ma üsna mõistlikult öelda, et miski on veel hullem kui sõda. Pean silmas III maailmasõja, esimese rikka suurte riikide vahel vahetult pärast II maailmasõda peetud sõda, tõenäoliselt tuumaapokalüpsist hõlmava sõja riski suurenemist. Ma ei usu, et enamik inimesi, kes liiguvad maailmas teise maailmasõja poole, arvavad, et nad seda teevad. Kuid ma ei arva, et isegi ExxonMobili tegevjuht peab ennast kliima kokkuvarisemise põhjustajaks. Kui USA president tahaks alustada kolmandat maailmasõda ja oleks sellest teadlik, käivitaks ta lihtsalt tuumarelvad. Aga siin tahan ma tõesti mõelda: kui ühiskond tahaks alustada Teist maailmasõda, ilma et oleks sellest teadlik, siis mida see teeks? Ma tean, et Freud võttis palju vaeva, öeldes, et inimestel on mingi salapärane surmasoov, kuigi nad seda eitavad. Kuid ma arvan, et siinkohal lasub tõendamiskoormis neil, kes püüavad tõestada, et ta eksib, sest ma ei arva, et jõupingutused kogemata III maailmasõja alustamiseks ja kellegi või millegi muu süüdistamine näeksid USA ühiskonnast eriti välja. teeb praegu.

USA sõjaväel on plaanid sõda Hiina vastu ja räägitakse sellest, et sõda Hiina vastu on ehk mõne aasta pärast. Loomulikult nimetavad nad seda sõjaks Hiinaga ja võivad loota, et kongressi liikmed küllastavad meid ideega, et Hiina on rikkaks saades agressiivselt ohustanud USA prestiiži või kolinud agressiivselt Hiina ranniku lähedal asuvasse vette. Kuid fakt on see, et vaatamata oma sõjaliste kulutuste suurele suurenemisele, kuna USA on kolinud Hiina lähedale baase, vägesid, rakette ja laevu (sealhulgas seda, mida USA merevägi nimetab naeruväärselt Big Stick kandjate löögirühmaks), kulutab Hiina endiselt umbes 14% sellest, mida USA ja tema liitlased ning relvakliendid kulutavad igal aastal militarismile. Venemaa moodustab umbes 8% ainult USA sõjaväekulutustest ja nende langusest. Kui sellel planeedil oleks USA sõjaväe jaoks usaldusväärne vaenlane, kuuleksite praegu UFO -dest palju vähem. Me kuuleme ka Hiina inimõiguste rikkumistest, kuid pommid ei paranda tegelikult inimõigusi ja kui inimõiguste rikkumine õigustaks pommi, peaks USA pommitama ennast ja paljusid oma kallimaid liitlasi ning Hiinat. Samuti kuidas ähvardate kellegi vastu sõda selle eest, kuidas nad teie ostetud tooteid toodavad? Noh, võib -olla pole mõttekas eesmärk. Võib -olla on sõda eesmärk.

Kui sa tahaksid kolmandat maailmasõda lähemale tuua, siis mida sa tegema peaksid? Üks samm oleks muuta sõda normaalseks ja vaieldamatuks. Minge edasi ja kontrollige seda. Valmis. Täidetud. Lipud ja lubadused neile on kõikjal. Tänan teid oletatava teenuse eest igal pool. Sõjalised reklaamid ja tasulised mängueelsed tseremooniad on nii kõikjal, et kui sõjavägi unustab ühe eest maksta, loovad inimesed selle tasuta. ACLU väidab, et noori naisi tuleks lisada noormeestesse, kui nad on sunnitud registreerima eelnõu, mis sunnitakse vastu nende tahtmist sõtta minna kodanikuvabaduste küsimusena, kuna kodanikuvabaduselt võetakse täielikult ära kõik vabadus.

Kui president Joe Biden president Vladimir Putiniga kohtuma läks, julgustasid mõlemad suuremad erakonnad üldiselt vaenulikkust. Mägi ajaleht saatis e -kirja filmi videoga Rocky, nõudes, et Biden oleks koos Putiniga ringis Rocky. Kui vaatamata kõigele käitusid Biden ja Putin peaaegu tsiviillikult ja tegid väikse väikse avalduse, mis viitas sellele, et nad võivad jätkata täpsustamata desarmeerimist, ja Biden lõpetas Putini nimetamise hingetuks tapjaks, korraldasid kaks presidenti paar eraldi pressikonverentsi. Biden ’s ei lubatud Vene meedia küsimusi, kuid USA meedia tõi hulluse mõlemale. Nad esitasid tüütuid süüdistusi. Nad nõudsid punaseid jooni. Nad tahtsid pühenduda sõjale vastusena nn kübersõjale. Nad tahtsid avaldada umbusaldust ja vaenu. Nad tahtsid enesekindlat kättemaksu 2016. aasta valimiste arvatava varastamise ja president Donald Trumpi orjastamise eest. Ma oleksin veendunud, et nad oleksid ilmunud huvitamatule vaatlejale ühest UFO -st, kellega nad alati tegelevad, ja oleks tahtnud Teist maailmasõda.

USA sõjavägi ja NATO on tõepoolest öelnud, et sõda võib olla vastuseks kübersõjale. Putini pressikonverentsil arutas ta erinevaid olemasolevaid ja potentsiaalseid seadusi. Venemaa ja Hiina ning teised riigid on juba ammu otsinud lepinguid kosmose relvastamise keelamiseks ja kübersõja keelustamiseks. Ma arvan, et Bideni pressikonverentsil ei maininud keegi kunagi ühtegi seadust. Ometi oli pidev teema stabiilsuse nimel teistele reeglipõhise korra ” kehtestamine. Kuid miski ei suurenda ebastabiilsust rohkem kui asendada kirjapandud seaduste idee meelevaldsete seadustega, mis on tehtud võimukatel ametnikel, kes usuvad oma headusse ja usuvad seda nii palju, et teatavad, nagu Biden, et USA valitsus sekkuda kellegi teise valimistesse ja kui maailm sellest teada saaks, laguneks kogu rahvusvaheline kord. Me teame 85 välisvalimistest, millesse USA on viimase 75 aasta jooksul räigelt sekkunud, rääkimata mõrvakatsetest üle 50 välisriigi juhi vastu, ja teame, et küsitluse järel väidab maailm, et kardab USA valitsust ennekõike ohuks rahule ja demokraatiale. Ometi ei varise rahvusvaheline kord kokku sellepärast, et seda ei eksisteeri, mitte austusel põhinevate moraalinormide kogumina.

Kui tahaksite maailma teisele maailmasõjale lähemale viia, teadmata, et te seda teete, võite veenda ennast, et kehtestate maailmale lihtsalt Pax Americana, olenemata sellest, kas see meeldis maailmale või mitte, isegi kui te teate mõnest mõtete tagumine nurk, et varem või hiljem ei kannata maailm selle eest ja et kui see hetk saabub, surevad mõned ameeriklased ning et kui need ameeriklased surevad, karjuvad USA meedia ja avalikkus verd ja kättemaksu, justkui Möödunud aastatuhanded ei olnud neile midagi õpetanud ja BOOM -il on see, mida te isegi ei teadnud, et tahate, nagu ka päev pärast amazon.com -i sirvimist.

Aga kuidas tagada nende ameeriklaste tapmine? Noh, keegi teine ​​pole seda kunagi teinud, kuid üks idee oleks paigutada nad — ja siin ’s tõeline geniaalne löök koos peredega kogu maailmas. Alused toetaksid ja kontrolliksid mõnda kohutavat valitsust, vihastades kohalikke elanikke. Alused tekitaksid keskkonnakahju, aga ka joobeseisundi, vägistamise ja seadusetute privileegide nuhtlusi. Need oleksid omamoodi hiiglaslikud väravaga apartheidikogukonnad, kuhu kohalikud saaksid siseneda, et teha päevatööd, kui nad päikeseloojangul välja pääsevad. Võib -olla peaks seda trikki tegema 800 sellist baasi 80 riigis. Nad ei oleks rangelt võttes õigustatud tulevaste paratamatute sõdade osas, arvestades seda, mida saab lennukiga kuhugi liigutada, kuid need võivad lihtsalt muuta tulevased sõjad vältimatuks. Kontrollige seda loendist. Valmis. Ja peaaegu märkamatult.

OK, mida veel? Noh, ilma relvata saate vaenlaste vastu sõda pidada? Ameerika Ühendriigid on nüüd maailma, rikaste riikide, vaeste riikide, nn demokraatlike riikide, diktatuuride, rõhuvate kuninglike despootide ja enamiku enda määratud vaenlaste juhtiv relvatarnija. USA valitsus lubab relvamüüki ja/või annab tasuta raha relvade ostmiseks ja/või pakub väljaõpet 48 -le maailma 50 kõige rõhuvamast valitsusest vastavalt USA valitsuse rahastatud edetabelile ja#8212 pluss paljud vastikud valitsused jäid sellest edetabelist välja. Vähesed, kui mõni sõda toimub ilma USA relvadeta. Enamik sõdu toimub tänapäeval kohtades, kus toodetakse vähe või üldse relvi. Vähesed, kui kärbes sõdu käputäis riikides, mis toodavad enamikku relvi. Võib arvata, et Hiina tuleb teid järele. Teie kongressiliige arvab peaaegu kindlasti, et Hiina keskendub innukalt oma õiguse tasuta posti saatmise ja televisioonis soovi korral esinemise kaotamisele. Kuid USA valitsus rahastab ja relvastab Hiinat ning investeerib Hiinas asuvasse biorelvade laborisse, olenemata sellest, mis sellest välja on tulnud või mitte. Relvakaupmehed ei kujuta muidugi ette, et nad toovad kaasa II maailmasõja. Nad tegelevad lihtsalt äriga ja lääne hulluses on sajandeid olnud evangeelium, et äri põhjustab rahu. Need, kes töötavad relvamüüjate heaks, enamasti ei usu, et põhjustavad sõda või rahu, arvavad, et teenivad oma USA lippu ja niinimetatud teenistusliikmeid. Nad teevad seda teeseldes, et enamikku relvaettevõtteid ja kliente ei eksisteeri ja nende ainus klient on USA sõjavägi.

Hea küll, relvaotsik on hästi kaetud. Mida veel vaja on? Noh, kui soovite aastate või aastakümnete jooksul ühiskonna teise maailmasõjasse veeretada, peate vältima valimiste kõikumisi või populaarseid meeleolumuutusi. Sa tahad korruptsiooni suurendada nii kaugele, et võimu nihutamine ühelt suurelt erakonnalt teisele ei muutnud midagi kohutavalt olulist. Inimestel võib olla väike hädaabi või uus puhkus. Retoorika võib dramaatiliselt erineda. Kuid ütleme, et andsite 2020. aastal Valge Maja ja kongressi demokraatidele, mis peaks juhtuma, et surmarong jääks rööbastele? Noh, sa ei taha, et tegelikud sõjad lõppeksid. Miski ei muuda sõdu tõenäolisemaks kui teised sõjad. Kuna mõlemad majad olid eelmisel kongressil korduvalt hääletanud Jeemeni -vastase sõja lõpetamiseks, millele Trump pani veto, on teil vaja neid hääli kohe lõpetada. Sa tahad, et Biden teeskleks, et lõpetab osaliselt sõja Jeemeni vastu ja Kongress vaigistab. Sama Afganistaniga. Hoidke oma jõud seal ja ümbritsevatel baasidel vaikselt ning veenduge, et Kongress ei tee midagi sõja jätkamise tegeliku keelamise jaoks.

Tegelikult oleks ideaalne takistada Kongressil kunagi oma tõmblevaid väikeseid käppa tõstmast, nagu ta Jeemeni ees tegi, kui ta võis loota Trumpi vetole. Võib -olla võib lubada AUMF -i (või sõjalise jõu kasutamise loa) kehtetuks tunnistamise alates 2002. aastast, kuid jätta 2001. aasta oma alles igaks juhuks, kui seda kunagi vaja oleks. Või võib selle asendada uuega. Samuti võidakse senaator Tim Kaine'i kelmusel lubada veidi edeneda - ja siin tühistab kongress ise sõjajõudude resolutsiooni, milles täpsustatakse, kuidas saab sõdu ära hoida, ja asendab selle nõudega, et presidendid konsulteeriksid enne vabanemist Kongressi ignoreerida. Trikk on seda, et seda sõjajõudude resolutsioonist loobumist turustatakse sõjajõudude resolutsiooni tugevdamisena. OK, see peaks toimima. Mida veel?

Suurendage sõjalisi kulutusi väljaspool Trumpi taset. See on võti. Ja kutsuge nn progressiivseid kongressi liikmeid paljudele kohtumistele, võib-olla isegi lubage neil paar presidendilennukitega sõita, ähvardage mõnda neist eelvalimistega, mida iganes on vaja, et nad ei üritaks sõjalisi kulutusi tõepoolest blokeerida. Viis neist täiskogus võisid blokeerida kõik, millele vabariiklased vastu seisavad, kuid 100 neist ei avalda üldse avalikku kirja, milles teesklevad, et on vastu sellele, mida nad hõlbustavad. OK, see osa on lihtne. Mida veel?

Vältige rahu Iraaniga. Mis kasu sellest oleks? Jääge seisma ja varitsege, kuni oleme Iraani valimistest möödas ja nad on saanud uue ülivaenuliku valitsuse, ning süüdistage seejärel iraanlasi. See ’ pole kunagi varem ebaõnnestunud. Miks see nüüd ebaõnnestus? Jätkake Iisraeli rünnakute rahastamist ja relvastamist Palestiina vastu. Jätkake Russiagate'i jätkamist või vähemalt ärge sellest loobuge, isegi kui ajakirjanikud hakkavad ilmuma ja#8212, mitte lihtsalt hulluks minema. Väike hind, mida maksta, ja meedia ei meeldi nagunii kellelegi, ükskõik kui palju ta sellele ka ei kuuletu.

Mida veel? Noh, peamine vahend, mis on üha enam tõestanud oma väärtust, on sanktsioonid. USA valitsus karistab jõhkralt paljusid elanikke kogu maailmas, õhutades kannatusi, vaenu ja sõjakust ning keegi ei tea seda või nad arvavad, et see on pigem õiguskaitse kui seaduserikkumine. See on suurepärane. USA valitsus võib isegi kehtestada sanktsioone, põhjustada kannatusi, süüdistada kannatused kohaliku omavalitsuse pingutustes leevendada kannatusi ja pakkuda lahenduseks otse reeglipõhisest korraldusest riigipööre (me valitseme, seega anname korraldused).

Samuti hoiame kindlasti kliimakatastroofi õigel kursil ja seda mitmel põhjusel. Esiteks, kui tuumaapokalüpsis kunagi ei tule, tuleb kliima. Teiseks, kliimakatastroofe saab kasutada rahvusvaheliste kriiside õhutamiseks, mis piisava hoogustamise ja relvastamisega võivad põhjustada sõdu. Kolmandaks võib sõjaväge tegelikult turustada kliimakaitsjana, sest kuigi see on kliimamuutuste peamine panustaja, saab ta teatada oma murettekitavast olukorrast ja kasutada loodusõnnetusi sissetungide vabandamiseks ja uute baaside rajamiseks. Ja miski ei ehita sõjavaimu paremini kui pagulased, olenemata sellest, kes nende õuduste eest põgenes.

Isegi haiguspandeemiad võivad aidata selle põhjust edendada, kui välditakse neile mõistlikku ja koostöös toimuvat reageerimist. Soovime tasakaalustada Hiina süüdistamist biorelvade laborite või nende rahvusvaheliste partnerite ja investorite süüdistamise vältimisega. USA valitsus saab meedia kaudu täielikult kontrollida, millised võimalikud selgitused pandeemia päritolu kohta on vastuvõetavad ja milliseid peetakse irooniliselt piisavalt hulluks. Mida me tahame vältida, on kahtluse alla seada laborite säilitamise prioriteet, mis suudavad luua uusi vahendeid sõdade jaoks, ja pakkuda välja globaalseid lahendusi pandeemiatele, mis võivad soodustada koostööd või mõistmist, mitte kasumit ja jagunemist.

OK, kas sellest ei piisa? Mida veel vaja võiks minna? Noh, sa ei saa väga hästi kolmandat maailmasõda otse proovile panna, eks? Me tahame korraldada mõningaid täiskleidiproove, suuri, selliseid, mis võivad kogemata muutuda tõeliseks ja#8212 suurimateks Euroopas ja Vaikse ookeani piirkonnas. Ja veel rakette Venemaa ja Hiina lähedal ning rohkem riike, kes on kutsutud NATO -sse, eriti mõned neist otse Venemaa piiril, mille Venemaa sõnul ei jääks nad kunagi seisma. Sõda Ukrainas on liiga ilmne. Kuidas oleks riigipöördega Valgevenes? Soovite riskida II maailmasõjaga, ilma et peaksite kahe jalaga otse sisse hüppama. Lõppude lõpuks peavad teised mehed seda alustama. Laseme mõelda. Kuidas sattus USA II maailmasõda?

Seal oli Atlandi harta. Teeme uue. Kontrollima. Jaapanit karistati ja ähvardati. Tehke see Hiina. Kontrollima. Saksamaal toetati natside toetamist. Tehke see Ukraina. Kontrollima. Vaiksel ookeanil olid suured uued baasid ja laevad ning lennukid ja väed. Kontrollima. Kuid ajalugu ei kordu täpselt. Võimalusi on palju. Droonimõrvad ja -baasid ning nn terrorivastased operatsioonid üle Aafrika ja Aasia. Riigipöörded ja destabiliseerimine Ladina -Ameerikas. Palju kuumaid kohti. Palju relvi. Palju propagandat. Kübersõjad igal ajal ja igal ajal ja kes oskab kindlalt öelda, kes need käivitas? Sõda läheb aina kergemaks.

Nüüd esitagem ’s teistsugune küsimus. Milline näeks välja USA ühiskond, kui ta tahaks vältida Teist maailmasõda? Noh, see jätaks kõrvale erandliku eksituse ja ühineks maailmaga, ei oleks enam inimõiguste lepingute suurim takistaja, enam ÜRO suurim vetoandja, ei oleks Rahvusvahelise Kriminaalkohtu ja Rahvusvahelise Kohtu suurim vastane, hakkaks toetama Õigusriigi põhimõtte asemel #RuleBasedOrder, hakake toetama demokraatiat ÜRO -s, mitte sõnadena, mida te kõnedes ütlete, ning seadke esikohale koostöö ülemaailmsetes jõupingutustes keskkonna- ja terviseprobleemide lahendamiseks.

Ameerika Ühendriikide kavatsusega vältida Teist maailmasõda näete, et raha nõudvad inimesed liiguvad militarismist inimeste ja keskkonna vajadustele, näete vastuseisu kogu elanikkonna militarismile ja liikumistele, mida militarism otseselt mõjutab. ja üldiselt teesklevad, et nad pole sellised, nagu keskkonnahoid, vaesusevastane võitlus, sisserändajate õigused, kodanikuvabadused ja läbipaistvad valitsuste liikumised. Näete samme demilitariseerimiseks, välisbaaside sulgemiseks, kodumaiste baaside sulgemiseks, relvade rahastamiseks, sõjatööstuste muutmiseks rahumeelseteks ja jätkusuutlikeks tööstusharudeks. Näete inimesi, kes esinesid televisioonis ja kellel oli eelseisvate sõdade osas õigus, lubada uuesti televisioonis, mitte ajaveebidesse ja Facebooki algoritmide põhja. Te näeksite sõdade kohta valetamist kui muud kvalifikatsiooni, kui valetada rohkemate sõdade kohta.

Näete sõdade kohta palju lihtsamat ja lihtsamat aruandlust, sealhulgas seda, mida nimetati inimeste humaniseerimiseks. Ma ei ole enne humaniseerimist kunagi aru saanud, mis inimesed väidetavalt on, kuid tundub, et nad pole kindlasti inimesed. Võtame näiteks Jeemenis seitsmeaastase poisi, kes ütleb emale, et tahab kooli minna. Tema nimi on Chakir ja ta räägib natuke raskustega, mida põhjustavad naljakad hambad ja halb harjumus. Aga see pole põhjus, miks ema ei taha, et ta kooli läheks. Ta kardab rakette. Ta õpetab Chakrit kodus. Ta istub söögilaua kõrval väikese puidust laua taga ja teeskleb, et on koolis. His mother loves him and finds him adorable and enjoys having him there, although she gets tired, needs a break, and knows school would be better. But then the buzzing grows louder. Chakir crawls under his desk. He smiles. He tries to think it’s funny. But the buzzing gets even louder. It’s straight overhead. Chakir starts to cry. His mother gets down on her knees and goes to him. When Chakir is finally able to get some words out, he says “It’s not safer here than at school. It’s not safer here than at school, Mommy!” The drone passes over. They’re still there. They’ve not been obliterated. The next day, Chakir’s mother allows him to board a bus to school. The bus is struck by a U.S.-supplied missile via the Saudi military and U.S. targeting. Chakir’s mother buries part of one of his arms, which is found in a tree. Now he’s humanized. But they’re all humans. The victims are all humans, though if the media won’t humanize them, people will deny it to themselves. In a society bent on avoiding war, the humanizing would be relentless. And when it wasn’t, protests would demand it.

Of course there is a wide gap between driving hard toward WWIII and proceeding to abolish all militaries. Of course it can only be done by stages. But when the stages are not understood as steps away from apocalypse and in the direction of sanity, they tend not to work very well, even to backfire. War has been so reformed and perfected that people imagine guided missiles killing only and exactly those who really need killing. We can’t survive much more reforming of war. The United States could radically scale back its militarism, destroy all of its nuclear weapons, and close all of its foreign bases, and you’d see a reverse arms race among other nations as a primary result. The United States could simply stop selling weapons to others and see militarism rolled back significantly. The United States could withdraw from NATO and NATO would vanish. It could stop badgering other nations to buy more weapons, and they’d buy fewer weapons. Each step toward a world beyond war would make such a world appear more reasonable to more people.

So, that’s what we’re working on at World BEYOND War. We’re doing education and activism to build a culture of peace and to advance demilitarization around the globe including through divestment of funding from weapons and through efforts to close bases. We’re also working to align more movements and organizations against war by making the connections across divisions, such as by pressuring the conference scheduled for November in Scotland to stop excluding militarism from climate agreements, and working to demilitarize domestic police forces. I’m not sure we shouldn’t be also developing alliances with mental health workers, because either war is crazy or I am. I ask only that you take your time in deciding which.


Deliberate Force: Reaffirmation of the Gulf Experience

Nor was the Gulf War an isolated example. From 30 August through 14 September 1995, for the first time in its history, NATO forces engaged in combat operations, against Bosnian Serbian forces in the former Yugoslavia. A total of 293 aircraft, based at 15 European locations and operating from three aircraft carriers, flew 3,515 sorties in Operation Deliberate Force, to deter Serbian aggression. Somewhat less than 700 of these sorties targeted command and control, supporting lines of communication, direct and essential targets, fielded forces, and integrated air defences. A total of 67 per cent of all such targets engaged were destroyed 14 per cent experienced moderate to severe damage, 16 per cent light damage, and only three per cent were judged to have experienced no damage.36

In contrast to the Gulf War, the vast majority of NATO munitions employed in the Bosnian conflict were precision ones: in fact, over 98 per cent of those used by American forces. American forces employed a total of 622 precision munitions, consisting of 567 laser-guided bombs (303 GBU㪢, 115 GBU㪤, 143 GBU㪨, and 6 GBU㪰), 42 electro-optical or infrared-guided weapons (10 SLAM, 9 GBU㪧, and 23 Maverick), and 13 Tomahawk Land Attack cruise missiles (TLAM). American airmen dropped only 12 ‘dumb’ bombs, consisting of 10 Mk 83’s, and 2 CBU㫯’s. Precision weaponry accounted for 28 per cent of NATO munitions dropped by non-US attackers. Sorties by Spanish, French, and British strike aircraft dropped 86 laser-guided bombs, and French, Italian, Dutch, and United Kingdom attackers dropped 306 ‘dumb’ bombs. Overall, combining both the American and non-American experience in Bosnia, there were 708 precision weapons employed by NATO forces, and 318 non-precision ones thus precision weaponry accounted for 69 per cent of the total employed in the NATO air campaign. Combined statistics of American and NATO experience indicate that the average number of precision weapons per designated mean point of impact (DMPI) destroyed was 2.8. In contrast, the average number of ‘dumb’ general purpose bombs per DMPI destroyed was 6.6. The average number of attack sorties per DMPI destroyed was 1.5.37

As a result of NATO’s first sustained air strike operations, all military and political objectives were attained: safe areas were no longer under attack or threatened, heavy weapons had been removed from designated areas, and Sarajevo’s airport could once again open, as could road access to the city. More importantly, the path to a peace agreement had been secured. In sum, for an overall expenditure of approximately 64 weapons per day - 69 per cent (44) of which were precision weapons - NATO forces achieved their military and political objectives. The leverage that this weaponry gave over Balkan aggressors and the recognition of what precision air attack means to decision-makers in the modern world was enunciated by former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke after the conclusion of the campaign and the settlement of the Dayton Peace Accords:

One of the great things that people should have learned from this is that there are times when air power - not backed up by ground troops - can make a difference. That’s something that our European allies didn’t all agree with. Americans were in doubt on it. It made a difference.38

Holbrooke’s statement hints at one of the major effects of precision, namely that the traditional notion of massing a large ground force to confront an opponent, particularly on a ‘field of battle,’ is now rendered archaic. To a degree, throughout military history, the span of influence of ground forces was always spreading out the battle area at the expense of ‘mass’. As the zone of lethality an individual soldier could command increased, the spacing between soldiers expanded as well. Such spacing meant that artillery fire, however well- targeted, nevertheless could not achieve the kind of density on a day-to-day basis to control or eliminate opposition. For example, despite a truly gargantuan leavening of artillery rounds per square yard of the Western Front during the ‘Great War,’ the Germans and allied forces only rarely achieved decisive effect, resulting in a war of attrition that generated millions of casualties. But the precision attacker overcomes the expansion of the linear battlefield by exercising the ability to undertake individual targeting at ranges far in excess of even the most powerful artillery. Thus airplanes, ‘smart’ ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, launched hundreds of miles away from a frontline, can then pass beyond that frontline for a distance of hundreds of miles more before targeting some key enemy facility or capability that directly influences the success of enemy operations at the front itself. This is true flexibility, of a sort again unknown to previous military eras.


Ajalugu

Early attempts

There were several attempts, of varying success, to use gliding bombs late in the Second World War, but the available sensing and guidance technology were inadequate for effective use. Even television cameras, a reliable commodity today, could only transmit a crude picture from the nose of a bomb.

The U.S. AZON was a conventional bomb that had been equipped with aerodynamic control surfaces, and could be steered, by radio from a human operator, left and right in azimuth, hence the name. An improved version, RAZON, could be adjusted in range (i.e., range and azimuth). Guidance and control were totally manual, based on what the weapon operator could see in the television link, and using switches to adjust fins to shift the name — it was not "flown" with a control stick as is an aircraft. [1]

One of the problems of the AZON and related weapons is that to be guided, they could not roll, as did conventional bombs. Rolling, however, stabilized the flight path, so the weapons operator both had to correct drift ja aim at the target.

While the German Fritz-X is often called a guided bomb, most models appear to have been was rocket-assisted and really an air-to-surface missile. It had dramatic results, sinking the Italian battleship Roma after Italy surrendered and Germany kept fighting.

First modern guided bombs

During the Vietnam War, the Paul Doumer Bridge was a critical and heavily-defended target, which had withstood hundreds of sorties with conventional bombs dropped by skilled crews, but had never been out of service for more than two months.

Rockwell International developed the GBU-8 laser-guided bomb (LGB) in 1967, but such weapons were not used against the Doumer Bridge until 1972. In comparison to the hundreds of aircraft sorties needed to deliver light damage, 16 F-4 Phantom II fighter-bombers struck the bridge in May 1972, using 2000 pound GBU-10 LGBs . This relatively small attack put the bridge, which carried four of the five railroad lines between North Vietnam and China, out of service for seven months. [2]


The Most Accurate Bombs In History

The U.S. military is fighting perhaps the most accurate air war in history, with most of the 8,000 precision-guided bombs and missiles loosed on Iraq blasting their intended targets.

But "precision" weapons also miss. Human and mechanical errors send 10 percent or more astray, Pentagon and civilian experts say &mdash a disastrous percentage for civilians living near the intended targets.

"No weapons system is foolproof," said Lt. Cmdr. Charles Owens, a spokesman for the U.S. Central Command in Qatar. "We'll always have one or two that go off target."

Some of the dozens of Iraqi civilians killed and wounded may have fallen victim to American precision weapons that, for reasons of mechanical failure or human error, struck homes, markets or city streets rather than military targets.

"Statistically, several hundred of those have missed to some degree," said Rob Hewson, editor of Jane's Air-Launched Weapons.

An explosion that killed 14 civilians in Baghdad's Shaab neighborhood last Wednesday may have been caused by a U.S. missile, perhaps an anti-radar missile aimed at air defenses or a wayward cruise missile. Coalition briefers have suggested one of Iraq's own air defense missiles tumbled to earth and exploded.

Populaarsed uudised

Also under dispute is the cause of a deadly explosion Friday in a Baghdad market that Iraq blames for 60 deaths.

"These two marketplace attacks are looking increasingly sure to have been caused by coalition weapons than went off target," Hewson said.

Terrain-hugging U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles fired by ships in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Persian Gulf have also missed targets. A handful of the 700 fired in the war have slammed mistakenly into Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, leading the Saudis and Turks to ask the Pentagon to stop firing them across their territory. Iran has protested at least three hits by U.S. missiles.

"If you're going to use cruise missiles, you're going to have ones coming down where they're not supposed to," said David Isby, a private missiles and munitions consultant in Washington, D.C. "This isn't a scandal for long-range operations. It's to be expected."

Bombs and missiles that can be programmed to follow a laser trail or hit a specific geographic coordinate based on satellite guidance comprise about 90 percent of those used in the 12-day-old war, Owens said. The bombs go wrong when they're aimed at mistaken targets or given incorrect coordinates, Isby said.

Laser and satellite-guided bombs can also be pushed off-course by winds, by out-of-date geographic data, a misreading of the attacking aircraft's position or an inherent flaw known as target location error &mdash meaning a location triangulated by satellites doesn't match a spot on earth, Hewson said.

Motors that move the bombs' guiding fins sometimes also fail, Isby said.

Since the Pentagon isn't sharing data on hits and misses, Hewson and other analysts base their predictions of accuracy on anecdotal evidence and data from previous wars.

A Canadian military assessment of laser-guided bomb accuracy during the Kosovo campaign in 1999 showed that 60 to 70 percent hit their targets, Hewson said. Since NATO faced tougher air defenses and weather in that campaign, he said he figures the current combination of laser- and satellite-guided bombs are hitting targets 75 to 80 percent of the time.

"There's a significant gap between 100 percent and reality," he said. "And the more you drop, the greater your chances of a catastrophic failure."

Laser-guided weapons suffer from other problems, including losing their "lock" on the laser target beam, which can be obscured by clouds or smoke. Hewson cited British military video from the 1991 Gulf War that showed a pair of laser-guided bombs gliding far beyond their bridge target and slamming into an Iraqi town.

Hewson said Tomahawks, which use radar to follow reference points on the ground, sometimes get lost over featureless deserts.

At the Pentagon, Air Force Lt. Col. Christy Nolta said that despite painstaking planning, "there's no way to eliminate the risk" of civilian deaths.

"These are mechanical devices, and mechanical devices will have mechanical failures," Nolta said. "Human error also plays into it."

Besides the tragedy of dead civilians, Hewson said errant bombing stokes anti-U.S. and anti-British hostility.

"In a war that's being fought for the benefit of the Iraqi people, you can't afford to kill any of them," Hewson said. "But you can't drop bombs and not kill people. There's a real dichotomy in all of this."

First published on March 31, 2003 / 6:12 PM

© 2003 The Associated Press. Kõik õigused kaitstud. Seda materjali ei tohi avaldada, edastada, ümber kirjutada ega ümber levitada.


Special Operations Outlook 2019 Digital Edition is here!

The Italian battleship Roma listing after being hit by German Fritz X radio-controlled bombs launched by Do 217s, Sept. 9, 1943. Italian Navy photo

A couple of hours after midnight on the morning of Sept. 9, 1943, a large force of Italian warships – three battleships, three cruisers, and eight destroyers – slipped out of the northern Italian port of La Spezia. Leading them was the Roma, the Italian Navy’s newest and largest battleship, and they were going out to attack a large Allied naval force, which was, at that moment, staging an amphibious invasion further down the coast at Salerno. At least that was what Adm. Carlo Bergamini told a local German commander. But what they were really doing that night was switching sides and joining the Allies.

Roma was a beautiful, capable warship, and perhaps in other circumstances her role in history might have been a gallant or even decisive one. But instead, it was limited to a single, brief appearance as a sort of sacrificial lamb, slaughtered at the altar of a horrible new kind of weapon.

Roma was a beautiful ship, but then, building beautiful warships was something the Italians were known for. She was trim, and graceful, unlike, say, British warships, which tended to be blocky, purposeful, and businesslike. Kuid Roma was not just pleasing to the eye, she was also well-armored, fast moving, and very capably armed with three main gun turrets, two forward and one aft, each mounting three 15-inch guns that could fire a high-velocity, armor-piercing shell more than 25 miles. Roma was built to withstand incoming shells, and its compartmented hull, with its ingenious system of bulkheads and expansion cylinders, was made to withstand enemy torpedoes.

The Italian battleship Roma was considered to be a beautiful ship in keeping with Italian naval design. Italian Navy photo

Roma was a beautiful, capable warship, and perhaps in other circumstances her role in history might have been a gallant or even decisive one. But instead, it was limited to a single, brief appearance as a sort of sacrificial lamb, slaughtered at the altar of a horrible new kind of weapon.

By this point, the war was going very badly for Italy and they wanted out. Mussolini had already been deposed and arrested two months earlier, and even though his successor, Prime Minister Badoglio, continued to openly profess solidarity with Adolf Hitler, he quickly started secret negotiations with Allied supreme commander Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The most warlike thing Roma had done was serve as a floating anti-aircraft battery during air raids while tied up in La Spezia.

At the beginning of September, a secret “short” armistice was signed between representatives of Badoglio and Eisenhower, which, among other things, called for handing over the Italian fleet to the Allies at Malta. Over the next several days, the navy’s commanders were told to make preparations for getting under way, though none except for Bergamini and one or two others were told the actual reason why. The fleet got ready, but there were repeated delays and postponements. Then, on Sept. 8, just as they were beginning their invasion of Salerno, the Allies announced the armistice from a radio station in Algiers. The cat was out of the bag, and Italy was plunged into chaos. A few hours later, Bergamini boarded the Roma and gave the order to cast off and head for the open sea.

Jaoks Roma, this marked her first actual foray out since joining the fleet a year earlier. During that time, Roma had clocked only about 130 hours under way, and all while repositioning from one port to another. The other warships had taken part in some naval actions earlier in the war, but for the last two years it had been the same story for them as well. Italy had been suffering from a major fuel shortage. Not having any native source of petroleum, Italy depended on Germany for fuel, and Germany wasn’t exactly flush either. The most warlike thing Roma had done was serve as a floating anti-aircraft battery during air raids while tied up in La Spezia. Twice during that time, she’d been severely damaged after being hit by large bombs dropped from American B-17s. She’d had to be towed to Genoa for repairs.

The Italian battleship Roma at anchor. The Roma was sunk on Sept. 9, 1943. Italian Navy photo

The armistice agreement directed the Navy to go to Malta and surrender the ships there. However, Bergamini had a different plan. He was taking his fleet to La Maddelena on Sardinia, where King Victor Emmanuel III was setting up a “free government” favorable to the Allies. Eisenhower had apparently given his approval and allowed the transfer of one Italian destroyer there to be placed at the King’s disposal. Bergamini decided it might be a better idea to move the whole fleet there and let the monarch take his pick.

Once in the open sea, the fleet was joined by three cruisers from Genoa. The flotilla steamed through the rest of the night, making good speed and keeping about fifteen miles off the west coast of Corsica. At dawn they spotted an allied aircraft shadowing them. Bergamini took it as a good sign.

No one bombed ships from heights like that, not if they wanted to actually hit it. Besides, they estimated that instead of releasing their bombs at an 80-degree angle, as was normally done, they had released them at a 60-degree angle. It didn’t make any sense. Why had they done that?

At 1200, the Italian fleet, traveling in line astern formation, made its first sighting of the Strait of Bonifacio, the four-and-a-half-mile gap separating Corsica from Sardinia. Bergamini ordered a 90-degree turn toward La Maddelena. At 1340 they received news that the Germans had seized La Maddelena. Bergamini immediately ordered the fleet to reverse course 180 degrees and head to Malta. By 1400, the fleet was in sight of the Asinara, a rocky, mountainous island off the northwestern tip of Sardinia. Beyond it lay the western Mediterranean.

Then the lookouts spotted aircraft shadowing them. They were twin-engine aircraft, but flying at high altitude, and no one could tell for sure whether they were Allied or Luftwaffe. To the Italians’ surprise, they dropped bombs. But the bombs came down into the water, far from any other ships. As soon as they had, they turned and left. Everyone was bewildered. No one bombed ships from heights like that, not if they wanted to actually hit it. Besides, they estimated that instead of releasing their bombs at an 80-degree angle, as was normally done, they had released them at a 60-degree angle. It didn’t make any sense. Why had they done that? Could it be that they weren’t actually trying to hit them?

A German Fritz-X Guided Bomb in the World War II Gallery at the National Museum of the U.S. Air Force. U.S. Air Force photo

More than an hour passed and nothing happened. Asinara Island was much closer now. Then the lookouts reported that the twin-engine aircraft were back. The lookouts identified them as German Dornier Do 217 medium bombers. Each seemed to be carrying a single, very large bomb under the wing in the space between the starboard engine and fuselage.

At 1530, the aircraft climbed from 5,000 up to 5,500 meters (18,044 feet) and then began closing in on the fleet. Bergamini ordered the ships to begin evasive maneuvers and told the AA batteries to open fire. A moment later the ships’ anti-aircraft guns started shooting, but the bombers were too high up to hit.

The bomber released its bomb and maintained its position as the bomb hurtled downward at them. Sure enough, as it came in, it became sickeningly obvious that the bomb was being steered to the target.

At 1533 the first aircraft attacked. It dropped its bomb at the same 60-degree angle as the earlier one had. But as it came down, they noticed that instead of simply falling downward, it came at them as if it were being steered. It splashed into the water, narrowly missing the stern of the battleship Italia by just a few feet. Then it exploded. A few seconds later, the Italia reported that the explosion had jammed its rudder and that it could no longer steer.

Tense minutes passed as the repair crews aboard the Italia struggled to free the rudder. While they did, messages traveled back and forth between the ships about what had happened. Several of the lookouts reported that the bomb seemed to have four long wing-like fins and a boxlike tail. Someone noted that instead of peeling off once the bomb had been released, the Dornier remained in place, flying slowly, as if it needed to stay there to guide the bomb in.

The Italian battleship Roma in her death throes, Sept. 9, 1943. Italian Navy photo

At 1545 there was another attack. The AA batteries opened fire, but again the bomber was beyond the range of their guns. The Do 217 released its bomb and maintained its position as the bomb hurtled downward toward the Italian fleet. Sure enough, as it came in, it became sickeningly obvious that the bomb was being steered to the target.

The bomb struck Roma on its starboard side aft of amidships, crashing through the ship’s seven decks, and exited the hull before exploding beneath the keel. The boiler rooms and after engine room flooded, disabling the two inboard propellers. Electrical arcing started innumerable fires throughout the after portion of the ship. Her speed now reduced to 12 knots, the Roma fell out of the battle group. By now, many of the ship’s electrically controlled systems, its directors and gun mounts were out.

What sent Roma to the bottom was the first of a wholly new class of weapon, known today as precision guided munitions (PGM). This PGM in particular was a massive 3,450-pound, armor-piercing, radio-controlled, glide bomb, which the Luftwaffe called Fritz-X.

At 1552, Roma was hit by a second bomb, again on the starboard side, this time detonating inside the forward engine room. The forward magazine detonated. There was heavy flooding in the magazines of main battery turret No. 2 as well as the forward portside secondary battery turret. A few moments later the No. 2 turret’s magazines exploded, blowing the entire turret skyward. The forward superstructure was destroyed with it, killing Bergamini, the ship’s captain, Adone Del Cima, and nearly everyone else there. Fires had broken out all over the ship. Whoever wasn’t killed was burned horribly. At 1612, Roma began going down, bow first. Then, her starboard decks awash, the Roma capsized, broke in two and sank. By 1615, she was gone, with 1,253 of her crew of 1,849 officers and men dead.

What sent Roma to the bottom was the first of a wholly new class of weapon, known today as precision guided munitions (PGM). This PGM in particular was a massive 3,450-pound, armor-piercing, radio-controlled, glide bomb, which the Luftwaffe called Fritz-X. It had been developed on the tails of the Hs 294, a more complex, but somewhat less effective, winged rocket, also deployed from a D0 217 bomber. Unbeknownst to almost everyone, the Hs 293 had already made its debut two weeks earlier, when it sank one British warship and seriously damaged two others in the Bay of Biscay.

A trial drop of a Fritz-X radio-controlled bomb. Fritz-X bombs were responsible for the sinking of the Roma. Bundesarchive photo

Unlike the Hs 293, which combined a compressed-air injection system with a binary-fuel rocket motor, Fritz-X was a simple system. To reach its target, Fritz-X mainly needed gravity. Dropped from 6,000 meters, Fritz-X came in at a nearly transsonic velocity, which is why it could go right through so many layers of deck and armor before exploding, something the Hs 293 could not do.

Fritz-X consisted of an 11-foot-long, machined steel penetrator casing, loaded with 320 kilograms of impact-fuzed amatol explosive. The bomb had four centrally mounted fins and a complex, boxlike tail structure, inside of which was a set of radio-controlled, electrically operated, oscillating spoilers that provided pitch and yaw control. Though the Fritz-X used the same radio-link receiver guidance package as the Hs 293, its control package included a gyroscope to provide roll stabilization. This was necessary, since it received controlling signals through a conformal antenna built into the tail section. The gyro ensured that the Fritz-X’s tail remained pointed at the aircraft throughout the drop.

Then, her starboard decks awash, the Roma capsized, broke in two and sank By 1615, she was gone, with 1,253 of her crew of 1,849 officers and men dead.

Guiding the Fritz-X was relatively simple. Upon release, a flare ignited in the bomb’s tail. Looking through the bombsight, the bombardier would simply line up the flare with the target, using a dual-axis, single joystick-equipped radio controller. After that, it was just a question of keeping the two lined up with each other.

For the next week, the Fritz-X repeatedly wreaked havoc at Salerno. Its first victim was the cruiser USS Savannah, which suffered more than two hundred dead when one of the glide bombs smashed into a gun turret. After that came the cruiser USS Philadelphia, followed by the Royal Navy‘s HMS Uganda, then several merchant ships and finally the British battleship Sõjaaegne. In each case, the ships were put out of action for up to a year, though all eventually went back into action. But as terrible as the damage was, it wasn’t enough to turn back the invasion.

The USS Savannah (CL 42) is hit by a German Fritz-X radio-controlled bomb while supporting Allied forces ashore during the Salerno operation, Sept. 11, 1943. The bomb hit the top of the ship’s number three gun turret and penetrated deep into her hull before exploding. This photograph shows the explosion venting through the top of the turret and also through Savannah’s hull below the waterline. A PT boat is passing by in the foreground. U.S. Naval Historical Center photo

The new weapons’ reign of terror also turned out to be short lived. As devastatingly effective as the Fritz-X and the Hs 293 might have been, they had two weaknesses. The first, the Allies figured out almost immediately: Once the Fritz-X had been dropped and started falling toward its target, the bomber needed to fly straight, level, and slow in order to guide it in. As long as the skies were uncontested, then there wasn’t a problem, but if there were any Allied fighters around, then the bomber could be easily shot down during this phase.

While none proved effective enough to allow the Germans to resume their guided bomb offensive, it did mark the beginning of a battle of measures and countermeasures, which today, 70-odd years later, shows no sign of abating.

At the same time, the British and Americans began developing electronic countermeasures to jam the radio link between the bomber and the bomb. The first Allied jammer proved ineffective, since it jammed the wrong frequencies. But subsequent improvements began to close the gap, which markedly reduced the effectiveness of the Fritz-X and Hs 293. Then an intact Hs 293 was discovered at a captured airfield up the beach from Anzio. Shortly after that, one of the radio control transmitters was recovered from a German bomber that had crashed on Corsica. The jammer developed as a result proved highly effective. By that point the Luftwaffe was already developing new variants of the two weapons that would be resistant to jamming. While none proved effective enough to allow the Germans to resume their guided bomb offensive, it did mark the beginning of a battle of measures and countermeasures, which today, 70-odd years later, shows no sign of abating.

Brendan McNally is a journalist and writer specializing in defense and aerospace. Brendan began his career.


Laser Guided Bombs

All LGB weapons have a CCG, a warhead (bomb body with fuze), and an airfoil group. The computer section transmits directional command signals to the appropriate pair(s) of canards. The guidance canards are attached to each quadrant of the control unit to change the flightpath of the weapon. The canard deflections are always full scale (referred to as "bang, bang" guidance).

The LGB flightpath is divided into three phases: ballistic, transition, and terminal guidance. During the ballistic phase, the weapon continues on the unguided trajectory established by the flightpath of the delivery aircraft at the moment of release. In the ballistic phase, the delivery attitude takes on additional importance, since maneuverability of the UGB is related to the weapon velocity during terminal guidance. Therefore, airspeed lost during the ballistic phase equates to a proportional loss of maneuverability. The transition phase begins at acquisition. During the transition phase, the weapon attempts to align its velocity vector with the line-of-sight vector to the target. During terminal guidance, the UGB attempts to keep its velocity vector aligned with the instantaneous line-of- sight. At the instant alignment occurs, the reflected laser energy centers on the detector and commands the canards to a trail position, which causes the weapon to fly ballistically with gravity biasing towards the target.

Target designators are semi-active illuminators used to "tag" a target. Typical laser guided bomb receivers use an array of photodiodes to derive target position signals. These signals are translated into control surface movements to direct the weapon to the target. An airborne detector can provide steering information to the pilot, via his gunsight, for example, and lead him on a direct heading to the target, finally giving him an aim point for a conventional weapon. Alternatively, a laser guided "smart" bomb or missile may be launched when a pilot is satisfied that the detector head has achieved lock-on and the launch envelope requirements are satisfied. In either of these cases, the pilot may never see the actual target, only the aim point as indicated by the laser.

Laser designators and seekers use a pulse coding system to ensure that a specific seeker and designator combination work in harmony. By setting the same code in both the designator and the seeker, the seeker will track only the target designated by the designator. The pulse coding is based on Pulse Repetition Frequency (PRF). The designator and seeker pulse codes use a truncated decimal system. This system uses the numerical digits 1 through 8 and the codes are directly correlated to a specific PRF. Dependent upon the laser equipment, either a three digit or a four digit code can be set. Coding allows simultaneous or nearly simultaneous attacks on multiple targets by a single aircraft, or flights of aircraft, dropping laser guided weapons (LGWs) set on different codes. This tactic may be employed when several high priority targets need to be expeditiously attacked and can be designated simultaneously by the supported unit(s).

    : Laser tracker pod used on the A-10 and A-7 aircraft. Does not contain a laser.
  • PAVE SPECTRE (AN/AVQ-19): Laser tracking and designator used on C-130 gunships. : Laser tracking and designator pod fitted on F-4 and F-111 aircraft. : Advanced optronics pod containing stabilized turret with FLIR, laser designator and tracker used on the F-4, RF-4, and F-111F aircraft.
  • PAVE ARROW (AN/AVQ-14): This was a laser tracker pod developed for use in conjunction with the PAVE SPOT laser designator used on O-2A FAC spotter planes, C-123, and was planned for use on the F-100. It was eventually merged with the PAVE SWORD program.
  • PAVE BLIND BAT: The PAVE BLIND BAT consisted of a laser target designator to illuminate targets for the PAVE WAY guided bombs. The PAVE BLIND BAT had an effective range of 18,000 feet and was developed for use by AC-130 gunships to aid supporting fighter aircraft.
  • PAVE FIRE: Development of laser scanner to aid F-4 Phantoms in securing proper target bearing.
  • PAVE GAT: Development of a laser rangefinder for use on the B-52G.
  • PAVE KNIFE (AN/ALQ-10): The original laser designator pod developed by Aeronutronic-Ford and used in combat in Vietnam.
  • PAVE LANCE: Developmental effort to replace the PAVE KNIFE by improving night capability with the addition of a FLIR in place of the low light television (LLTV). Superseded by PAVE TACK.
  • PAVE LIGHT (AN/AVQ-9): Stabilized laser designator developed for the F-4 Phantom.
  • PAVE NAIL (AN/AVQ-13): Modification of 18 OV-10 FAC aircraft with stabilized periscopic night sight and laser designator. Program coordinated with PAVE PHANTOM and PAVE SPOT.
  • PAVE PHANTOM: Addition of an ARN-92 Loran and computer to the F-4D allowing aircraft to store targeting information for eight separate positions illuminated by OV-10 PAVE NAIL.
  • PAVE PRONTO: Modification of AC-130 gunships for night attack including an LLTV Electro systems night observation camera, AAD-4, or AAD-6 FLIR and AVQ-17 illuminator.
  • PAVE SCOPE: Target acquisition aids for jet fighter aircraft such as the Eagle Eye (LAD) AN/AVG-8, and TISEO.
  • PAVE SHIELD: Classified project undertaken by Aeronautical Research Associates.
  • PAVE SPOT (AN/AVQ-12): Stabilized periscopic night vision sight developed by Varo for use on the O-2A FAC. The system was fitted with a Korad laser designator (ND:YAG).
  • PAVE STRIKE: A related group of air-to-ground strike programs include PAVE TACK and IR guided bombs.
  • PAVE SWORD (AN/AVQ-11): Laser tracker designed to pick up energy from targets illuminated by O-2A spotter planes. Used on F-4, and bore sighted with its radar set.

LGBs are not a "cure all" for the full spectrum of targets and scenarios facing fighter/attack aircraft, but they do offer advantages in standoff and accuracy over other types of free fall weapons in the inventory. In a high threat environment, LGB will be employed in a range of missions from close air support [CAS] to interdiction.

LGB are excellent performers in dive deliveries initiated from medium altitude. A steep, fast dive attack increases LGB maneuvering potential and flight ability. Medium altitude attacks generally reduce target acquisition problems and more readily allow for target designation by either ground or airborne designation platforms. Medium altitude LGB dive delivery tactics are normally used in areas of low to medium threat.

LGBs can miss the target if the laser is turned on too early. During certain delivery profiles where the LGB sees laser energy as soon as it is released, it can turn from its delivery profile too soon and miss by falling short of the target. To prevent this, the laser designator must be turned on at the time that will preclude the bomb from turning down toward the target prematurely. Normally, the pilot knows the proper moment for laser on. The specific LGB and the delivery tactics of the fighter/attack aircraft dictates the minimum designation time required to guide the weapon to the intended target.

The effects of smoke, dust, and debris can impair the use of laser-guided munitions. The reflective scattering of laser light by smoke particles may present false targets. Rain, snow, fog, and low clouds can prevent effective use of laser-guided munitions. Heavy precipitation can limit the use of laser designators by affecting line-of-sight. Snow on the ground can produce a negative effect on laser-guided munition accuracy. Fog and low clouds will block the laser-guided munition seeker's field of view which reduces the guidance time. This reduction may affect the probability of hit.

The three generations of Paveway LGB technology exist, each successive generation representing a change or modification in the guidance mechanism. Paveway I was a series of laser guided bombs with fixed wings. Paveway II [with retractable wings] and Paveway III are the Air Force designations for 500- and 2,000-pound-class laser-guided bombs (LGBs). A guidance control unit is attached to the front of the bomb, and a wing assembly is attached on the rear. Both generations are compatible with current Army, Navy (Marine), and Air Force designators. Paveway II and III have preflight selectable coding. Paveway III is the third-generation LGB, commonly called the low-level laser-guided bomb (LLLGB). It is designed to be used under relatively low ceilings, from low altitude, and at long standoff ranges.

During Desert Storm, the F-111F and the F-117 accounted for the majority of the guided bomb tonnage delivered against strategic targets. The Navy's A-6E capability to deliver LGBs was used only sparingly, despite the fact that the 115 A-6Es deployed constituted almost 51 percent of all US LGB-capable aircraft on the first day of Desert Storm. laser sensor systems demonstrated degradation from adverse weather, such as clouds, rain, fog, and even haze and humidity.

Videotapes of LGBs precisely traveling down ventilator shafts and destroying targets with one strike, like those televised during and after Desert Storm, can easily create impressions about the effect of a single LGB on a single target, which was summed up by an LGB manufacturer's claim for effectiveness: "one target, one bomb." The implicit assumption in this claim is that a target is sufficiently damaged or destroyed to avoid needing to hit it again with a second bomb, thus obviating the need to risk pilots or aircraft in restrikes. However, evidence does not support the claim for LGB effectiveness summarized by "one target, one bomb." In one sample of targets from Desert Storm, no fewer than two LGBs were dropped on each target six or more were dropped on 20 percent of the targets eight or more were dropped on 15 percent of the targets. The average dropped was four LGBs per target.

In Desert Storm, 229 US aircraft were capable of delivering laser-guided munitions. By 1996 the expanded installation of low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) pods on F-15Es and block 40 F-16s had increased this capability within the Air Force to approximately 500 platforms.


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